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THE IDENTITY CRITERION:
RESUSCITATING A CARDOZIAN, RELATIONAL
APPROACH TO DUTY OF CARE IN NEGLIGENCE
Tim Kaye*

I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

The Legacy of Palsgraf

Everyone agrees that the canonical case in American negligence
law is Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co.' In his famous majority
opinion in the New York Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Benjamin
Cardozo held that the outcome of the case turned on whether the
plaintiff, Mrs. Palsgraf, had been owed a duty of care by the Long Island
Railroad.2 He declared that the answer to this question depended on
whether the parties had a relevant relationship at the time of the conduct
under consideration. 3 "Negligence, like risk," he said, is "a term of
relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart from things related, is surely
not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all." 4
Over ninety years have passed since then. One thing that everyone
agrees upon (including Judge Charles Andrews, who wrote the almost
equally famous dissent in Palsgraf) is that not everyone who sustains an
injury as the result of someone else's negligence is entitled to
compensation in a court of law.5 In Andrews's words, "because of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. I am grateful to my colleagues,
Prof. Ann Piccard and Prof. Catherine Cameron, and to my former teaching assistant, Amber Nicol,
for their comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to Stetson for granting me a sabbatical to
enable me to spend time researching and musing on the law of torts, as well as to all the students on

whom I have tried out my ideas.
1. See 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
2. Id. at 99-100.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 101.
5. See id. at 102-04 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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6
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point."
Yet, torts lawyers continue to search in vain for a full articulation of a
relational approach to duty of care that tells us where that point is.
Corrective justice and civil recourse theorists have claimed to offer
approach, but their focus has been on explaining how and
relational
a
7
why-rather than whether-the plaintiff can seek a remedy. They have
tended to take it for granted that the relevant relationship is between the
immediate victim and the direct tortfeasor; and so, have failed to provide
meaningful guidance about just who qualifies as either plaintiff or
defendant.8 Indeed, they seem incapable of dealing with situations where
there are many victims with different types of injury (whether physical,
economic, or emotional). Nor can they explain why (as in Palsgraf
itself) a plaintiff may often sue not just the direct tortfeasor, but also a
9
secondary party whom the law considers to be vicariously liable.
These glaring shortcomings have led other scholars to either (a)
confuse the issue and treat Cardozo's opinion as one that (despite his
10
express statement to the contrary) was really about proximate cause; or
(b) reject a relational approach altogether. And, irrespective of whether
they claim to favor or reject a relational approach, many scholars-but
not, interestingly enough, the New York Court of Appeals itself"--have
further muddied the waters by insisting that, in the end, the test of
12
whether or not a duty of care exists is a matter of foreseeability.

B.

Why Does This Matter?

There is always a tendency for those who do not engage in legal
theory to ask why such things should matter. The answer in this instance
is as follows. While all areas of the law have their controversial features
and issues, these tend-at least, in long-standing areas of the law like
contracts and property-to occur at the margins of the field. In
negligence law, however, the very core is controversial. The question of
whether a duty is owed-and, if so, to whom-often remains very much
open to debate. In other words, unlike in contracts and property-and
despite Cardozo's efforts in Palsgraf-negligencelaw seems to have no
clear foundational concept. As a result, the law is quite simply a mess.
6. Id. at 103.
7.

See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINIUB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 187 (1995).

8. See id. at 186-87.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. Palsgraf; 162 N.E. at 101 ("The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to
the case before us.").

11. Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976) ("Foreseeability should not be
confused with duty.").
12. See infra Part V.B.
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As Dean Leon Green-one of the doyens of twentieth-century American
tort law-once said, "the lack of adequate legal theory [has] doubtless
blurred the problems presented for judgment."" And that was back in
1934!
This mess is exemplified by the treatment of duty in the most recent
Restatement on the law of torts.14 Section 7(a), for example, completely
rejects Cardozo's approach and instead adopts Judge Andrews's
minority opinion that presupposes that everyone owes a duty of care to
others, except when Section 7(b) says that they do not-a qualification
that is nowhere to be found in Judge Andrews's opinion.' 6 As if this
were not vague enough, the exception is said to exist "when an
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or
limiting liability in a particular class of cases." 17 Yet the Restatement
finds itself completely unable to say, as a general matter, what such
countervailing principles or policies might be. This is, to say the least, a
bizarre way to treat such a foundational doctrine as duty of care.
But even that is not all. Recognizing that the law has never imposed
a general duty on everyone to take action to ameliorate risks initiated by
someone (or something) else, Section 37 of the Restatement then takes a
position that is the very mirror-image of the approach in Section 7. This
time we are told that no one owes a duty in such circumstances "unless a
court determines that one of the affirmative duties provided" in the
following seven sections applies.1 8 Again, the Restatement provides no
overarching concept to link these seven exceptions together-albeit that
two are said to depend on the existence of some kind of relationship19so it seems that this is all completely ad hoc. Little wonder, then, that
Professor Jonathan Cardi has commented: "Perhaps the most persistent
impression left after having reviewed hundreds of duty cases is just how
frustratingly inconsistent, unfocused, and often nonsensical is the present

13.

Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 473 (1934).

14.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§7

(2010).
15. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102 ("Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect
society from unnecessary danger."); see also id. at 103 ("Everyone owes to the world at large the
duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.").
16. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD): LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
(2010) ("Duty (a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's
conduct creates a risk of physical harm. (b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing

principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may
decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires

modification.").
17. Id. §7(b).
18. Id. § 37.
19. Id. §§ 40, 4.
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state of duty law." 2 0 What is urgently required is a theory that can
provide a universal criterion against which courts may judge whether a
duty of care exists. Without it we are left with judges having to engage
in embarrassing verbal contortions as they attempt to do their best with a
list of phrases with little substantive meaning. A clearly articulated and
understood criterion that is capable of being applied to real-life cases
would bring much-needed clarity and predictability to the law and save
it from falling entirely into disrepute. It would also avoid a lot of entirely
unnecessary litigation, which wastes the courts' time and the parties'
money. And instead of claims of "overreach," "unwarranted expansion,"
or "formalistic refusal to recognize a duty" being little more than empty
slogans, we would have a means of identifying whether such claims are
well-founded or entirely spurious.
C.

Roadmap

This Article seeks to provide such a criterion, so that it should no
longer be possible to say that "the judges have sought in vain for some
substantial legal theory." 21 It proceeds as follows. Part II focuses on
22
fundamentals and analyzes the very role of the doctrine of duty of care.
In other words, it considers why the doctrine exists at all. This is a
question that seems too often to have been lost in the shuffle. Yet,
without the appropriate context, it is all too easy to misunderstand the
doctrine and, in turn, to fail to appreciate Cardozo's arguments about
how the doctrine should be applied.
Part III then moves on to what Cardozo said in Palsgraf 23 It shows
how his arguments were consistent not just with the role that the doctrine
is intended to play, but also with opinions he issued on the doctrine in
other cases across a fifteen-year period between 1916 and 1931.24 Paying
much closer attention to Cardozo's own words has, unfortunately, been
all too common. This Part explains not only that he considered
relationality to be the key to the doctrine of duty of care, but also that he
25
considered the victim's identity to be the key to relationality.
Part IV considers three common misinterpretations of Cardozo's
Palsgrafopinion and shows how each of these approaches fails to do his

20. W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf Modern Duty Law in Microcosm, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1875 (2011).
21.
22.
23.

Green, supra note 13, at 490.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.

24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
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words justice.2 6 It thus rejects the notion that Cardozo was dealing not
with duty, but with proximate cause. It also rejects the rather fanciful
notion that relationality implies a test of foreseeability. The existence (or
otherwise) of a relationship is not a matter of foreseeability at all. In fact,
the most that can be said of foreseeability in this context is that it
provides an underlying moral justification for the use of relationality to
determine duty. But it is certainly not a method of determining
relationality.
Part IV also considers the two schools of thought with which a
relational approach to duty has hitherto been most closely associated and
finds that they are not truly relational at all. 27 Instead of being interested
in "three-party situations,"28 both corrective justice theory and civil
recourse theory have focused exclusively on the bipolar relationship
between "sufferer and doer"2 9 : victim and direct tortfeasor. This
contrasts sharply with relational theory in the world of contracts, whose
whole point has been to direct attention to the complex set of relations in
which "every transaction is embedded."3 0 As a result, these
self-proclaimed relational theories of torts are unable to account for the
fundamental doctrine of tort law known as vicarious liability; and they
also have nothing to say about how to identify whom the law should
actually recognize as a victim.
Part V then goes on to explain how a Cardozo-inspired,
identity-based relational theory of duty of care in negligence revolves
around proof of a relevant relationship." In this context, a relationship is
relevant if it involves the type of interest that was ultimately harmed. 32
Such interests may relate to personal safety, the integrity of property,
financial prosperity, or emotional equilibrium. A relationship is not
relevant if it relates to an interest different from that ultimately harmed.3 3
Thus a relationship concerned with financial matters cannot, for

26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.C.
28.

LEON GREEN ET AL., CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS 3 (1940).

29. WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 186.
30. Ian R. Macneil, Reflections on Relational ContractTheory After a Neo-Classical Seminar,
in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 20708 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003) (emphasis in original).
31. See infra Part V.
32. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) ("Negligence is not
actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right.").
33. "In this case . . . the interests said to have been invaded, are not even of the same
order. The man was not injured in his person nor even put in danger... . If there was a

wrong to him at all, which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong to a property
interest only, the safety of his package."

Id. at 100.
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example, sustain a duty of care in respect of psychological injury, but it
will sustain a duty in respect of financial loss.
For primary victims-those who suffer injury not predicated on an
injury to someone else-such a relationship may be found between the
plaintiff and the defendant, or between the defendant and a third party,
or between the plaintiff and an organization that owes a duty to the
general public. But establishing such a relevant relationship is still not
quite enough. In addition, the relationship must be both (a) qualitatively
different from any relationship that the defendant might have with the
public at large; and (b) formed in circumstances that enable the
defendant to know the victim's identity.
Capacity to know the victim's identity may be established in one of
two ways. In cases of physical harm, identity may be established if either
(a) the victim (or the victim's property) was present at the scene at the
time of the tort; or (b) the defendant was in a position to know the
34
victim's name at the time of the tort. In cases of economic loss or
emotional distress, however, identity may be established only if the
defendant was in a position to know the victim's name at the time of the
tort.35 But while the defendant must have been able to identify the
plaintiff at the time of the tort, the converse need not be true. The
plaintiff does not need to have been able to identify the defendant.
Where either the plaintiff or defendant is at one remove from the
immediate nexus between primary victim and direct tortfeasor,
additional relationships are required. For vicarious liability, this requires
the addition of a relevant relationship between the direct tortfeasor and
vicarious defendant. 36 Secondary victims, on the other hand, need to
establish a relevant relationship between themselves and the primary
victim.37
As Part V will demonstrate, this identity-based, relational approach
38
makes the outcome of litigation significantly easier to predict. For it
can explain the outcomes of many past cases in much simpler and more
easily understood terms than the judges themselves could provide at the
time without the benefit of the theory to hand. This does not mean that I
am alleging some sort of judicial conspiracy to hide the truth. On the
contrary, my argument is essentially that many judges have already
subconsciously come to adopt the rationale of identity-based relational
theory. While their attempts to articulate the reasons for their decisions
34.
35.
36.
37.

See, e.g., Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1916).
See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922).
See, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1985).
See infra note 469 and accompanying text.

38.

See infra PartV.
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have often been somewhat confused and confusing, the outcomes
themselves-at least at the highest appellate level-have often been
quite consistent. 39 Adopting identity-based relational theory as the means
of resolving questions of duty in negligence will make those outcomes
predictable in advance, and so render much current litigation
unnecessary and infeasible, because both the parties and trial judge will
be in a position to know the answer to the duty question at a very early
stage.
Part VI concludes the Article by considering some of the emerging
or more controversial areas of the law of negligence today and shows
how an identity-based relational approach can tackle those issues
predictably and with relative ease.4 0
II.

ROLE OF DUTY OF CARE

A.

Risk-Taking

At its most fundamental level, a capitalist society is one based on
private ownership of the means of production, operated by
entrepreneurs-a category that ranges from one-person operations and
mom-and-pop businesses all the way up to multinational corporationsin pursuit of profit. 41 Profit is, of course, the reward for the successful
taking of risks, while those who take bad risks are sanctioned with
losses. 42 Such outcomes should not be based on pure luck; capitalism
requires that entrepreneurs deserve what they receive. This, in turn,
means that there has to be some way for them to make a meaningful
assessment of each risk in advance.
Without the ability to calculate a risk, there is no way to know
whether that risk is worth taking. And, without that ability, it will be
impossible to distinguish good decisions (worthy of the reward of
profits) from bad decisions (worthy of sanction through losses).
Capitalism does not, therefore, promote the taking of any and all
risks; instead, it seeks to encourage worthwhile risks. But the only way
to assess a risk is to compare the potential benefits with the potential
39. See infra Part V.C.
40.
41.

See infra PartVI.
See
Capitalism,

CAMBRIDGE

ENG.

DICTIONARY,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/capitalism (last visited Aug. 1, 2021) ("[A]n
economic, political, and social system in which property, business, and industry are privately
owned, directed toward making the greatest possible profits for successful organizations and
people[.]").
42. See Tim Kaye, Law and Risk: An Introduction, in RISK AND THE LAw 10 (Gordon R.
Woodman & Diethelm Klippel eds., 2008).
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hazards. If the potential hazards are indeterminate, then there is no way
to judge whether a risk is worth taking; if the risk is infinite, then no
benefit on earth can make it worth taking.
One relevant risk is, of course, legal risk.43 More specifically, it is
the risk of being held liable to pay for harm caused by one's actions.44
The common law developed two new fields to address this issue. One
was the law of contracts;4 5 the other was the law of torts." While both
had existed before the development of capitalism, they were both
significantly re-organized and re-conceived in order to meet the
demands of the new economic order.47 Both deal with the question of
risk by breaking it down into the following three questions:
1. Is there a legal risk at all (does the law recognize the
circumstances as a basis for potential legal liability)?
2. If there is such a risk, how much harm could the risk cost if it
occurs?
3. How many potential victims might there be (because this
number will act as a multiplier to the answer to question 2)?
While it is not typically possible to answer these questions with
100% certainty-after all, risks involve predicting the future, which is
rarely entirely certain-it is undoubtedly possible in many cases for
them to be answered with a high degree of confidence.4 8 It should be
noted, however, that each of these questions raises an issue of a
significantly different order.
The first two questions address kinds of risk that are easy to
classify. Whether a legal risk exists at all must, by definition, be a matter
of law that demands an answer of either yes or no. If the answer to this
first question is "no," there is no need to proceed to the other two
questions because they cannot come into play; the activity involves no
issues of interest to the laws of contracts and torts.
The question of the amount of harm that might be caused to each
victim, by contrast, involves a highly fact-intensive investigation of the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 4-5.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See id.
On the transformation of the law of contracts, see Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J. Pothier's

Influence on the Common Law of Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 267, 267 (2005). On the

transformation of the law of torts, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV.
652, 652-54 (1873).
48.

See, e.g., MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 227-28 (Frank H. Knight trans.,

1927) (1950).
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context and circumstances, with a resultant answer that can then be
expressed in financial terms. 49
But the third question-which asks how many victims there might
be-is neither self-evidently legal nor obviously factual. The law clearly
cannot predict the number of victims; but neither can fact-intensive
investigation. Instead, the number of victims is likely, in the end, to be
the product of a simple matter of (bad) luck.
Yet, we have already noted that unpredictable risks are precisely
what capitalism seeks to avoid. And this particular form of
unpredictability is exacerbated by that fact that the answer to this
question is, arguably, the most important of all. This is because it acts as
a multiplier: the dollar amount calculated as the likely cost of harm must
necessarily be multiplied by the number of victims in order to produce a
meaningful assessment of the total risk involved."
Even small differences in the answer to the question about the
number of victims can produce qualitatively different totals. Even if the
hazards can be accurately assessed per person, the total risk to be taken
still has to be multiplied by the number of potential victims. Yet, if the
class of potential plaintiffs is indeterminate in number, there is no way to
gauge the potential risk in advance, so the more indeterminate that
number becomes, the more difficult it then becomes to make a
meaningful risk assessment. Businesses and entrepreneurs will have no
idea what risk they are taking on, and potential liability insurers will
have no idea what level of premiums to charge. Which means that many
worthwhile risks will simply never be taken.
The only way to transform such unpredictability into something
"calculable"" is to ensure that the determination of the number of
victims is as much a matter of law as the question of whether there is
any risk at all. This means not only that it must then be decided by a
judge rather than by a jury, but also that it will always be subject to
appeal and the doctrine of precedent.52 In other words, this approach
enables appellate courts to lay down clear, systemic guidance to trial
judges about how to recognize who qualifies as a legally recognizable
victim.53

49. See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1269 (2011).
50. Paras Sharma, Economic Analysis of Tort Liability, INT'L J. LAW, 2020, at 1, 3-4.

51.

WEBER, supra note 48, at 228.

52. See Sandra A. Hoffmann & Michael Hanemann, Torts and the Protection of "Legally
Recognized" Interests, RES. FOR FUTURE, Aug. 2005, at 2.

53.

See id.
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Privity in Contracts

The law of contracts was the first branch of civil law to wrestle
with this problem.54 It deals with the issue through the doctrines of offer
55
and acceptance, which together establish privity of contract. Only those
who make or accept an offer can be said to be privy to the contract; and
only those who enjoy such privity can acquire the rights and obligations
that the contract creates: "[T]he law . . . creates the duty, establishes the
56
privity, and implies the promise and obligation."
It should be noted, however, that privity of contract does absolutely
nothing to address question (2) above. Only by looking at the
consideration and terms of the contract is it possible to estimate the harm
likely to be done if a specific party fails to adhere to the terms of the
contract.
What privity does achieve is play a significant role in determining
the answers to both questions (1) and (3). Together with the doctrine of
consideration (or, in some cases, that of promissory estoppel)," it
determines whether any contractual relationship has been created at all.
By itself, it also determines who is a party to the contract (and is
therefore capable of being a legally recognized victim of its breach)." It
is, in essence, a doctrine of standing.
The doctrine of privity thus enables every party to a contract to
know the identity of the other parties. 59 Which means, in turn, that the
total number of parties with rights under the contract must also be
known. While these specifications for the creation of a contractual
relationship have been somewhat relaxed by the idea that third-party
60
beneficiaries may also acquire contractual rights, the courts have still
61
required that any such beneficiary must be clearly identified. Even with
a more relaxed approach to the formation of a contract, therefore, it
remains the case that the parties to a contract always know both the

54. Vernon V. Palmer, The History of Privity-The FormativePeriod (1500-1680), 33 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 3, 6 (1989).
55. Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J. Pothier'sInfluence on the Common Law of Contract, 11 TEX.

WESLEYAN L. REV. 267, 277 (2005).
56. Brewer v. Dyer, 61 Mass. 337, 340 (1851).
57. See, e.g., Stanley D. Henderson, PromissoryEstoppel and TraditionalContractDoctrine,

78 YALE L.J. 343, 346 (1969).
58. See Privity of Contract, WESTLAW PRACTICAL LAW GLOSSARY (last accessed June 13,
2021).
59. Id.
60. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 271-72 (1859).
61. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931) ("[T]oday the beneficiary of
a promise, clearly designated as such, is seldom left without a remedy.").
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identity of those with rights over them and the total number of such
parties. 62
C.

Duty of Care in Negligence

In order to address the same questions, every tort also needs a
doctrine to enable it to identify not only whether anything of legal
significance has occurred, but also, if so, how many potential victims
might be entitled to seek compensation. The doctrine of duty of care
fulfills that role for the law of negligence. 63 It is thus also a doctrine of
standing.64
Like privity in contracts, duty does not specify the substantive
content of any obligation and so does not address question (2) above.
That role is actually performed by the doctrine of standard of care,
which can come into play only once it has first been determined that the
defendant in question did in fact owe a duty to the victim. 65 Duty of care
is precisely the doctrine to make that prior determination. In other
words, the role of duty of care in negligence is-again like privity in
contracts-to ascertain the answers to questions (1) and (3). It thus
determines whether any duties are owed at all and, if so, it identifies to
whom they are owed.66 Just as only those who are in privity can seek
remedies when those terms are breached, only those owed a duty of care
can seek a remedy in negligence. 6 7
More than any other element of the tort, it is duty which can
provide the basis for dismissal of a case, or summary judgment, or a
directed verdict, without the unpredictability of having to consider the
substantive merits. 68 Duty, in other words, is the foundation on top of
which the whole edifice of the law of negligence is built. It is
fundamental to providing the predictability essential for meaningful
assessment of legal risk.69 But there are two respects in which the

62. See id.
63.

See id.; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and

CorrectiveJustice, 39 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 299, 304 (2011).
64. Zipursky, supra note 63, at 304. Professor Ben Zipursky has referred to duty of care as a
doctrine of "substantive standing," but his use of the adjective "substantive" in this context seems

unnecessary and confusing. Id.
65. Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation of a
Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability Limiting
Use ofPolicy Considerations,34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1514 (1997).
66. See id.; see also infra Part H.A.

67.
68.

Lake, supra note 65, at 1508.
See id. at 1503-09; see also Holmes, supra note 47, at 652-54, 660-62.

69.

Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 vAND. L.

REV. 3, 8-9 (1998).
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challenge facing the doctrine of duty in negligence is significantly
different from that facing privity in contracts.
First, the absence of a doctrine of privity (or equivalent) from the
law of contracts would effectively mean that the law could not recognize
any contracts at all. 70 No contract could be created without some sort of
meaningful interaction (whether termed offer and acceptance, or
7
reasonable reliance) between two or more parties. 1 Without the doctrine
of privity (and the doctrines of offer, acceptance, and promissory
estoppel of which it is comprised), there could simply be no law of
contracts.
In negligence law, by contrast, the absence of a doctrine of duty of
care would not have the effect of eliminating the tort of negligence at all.
Quite the contrary. Probably the easiest way to demonstrate this is to
imagine what the law would look like without a doctrine of duty. That
would leave us with three elements: breach (i.e., negligent conduct),
causation, and harm.72 So everyone who suffered harm caused by
someone else's negligence would have a legitimate claim for
compensation against that other person.
For example, an auditor, who negligently certifies that a
corporation is financially sound when it is not, may thereby cause losses
to anyone who relies on the audit report. But those victims could include
those who bought stock in the corporation, those who lent it money,
those who sold it goods or services on credit, and those who gave up
employment elsewhere to work for it. Without a doctrine of duty in
place, every single member of one or more of these groups would have a
cognizable legal claim, and that would make for an indeterminable class
of potential plaintiffs. 73 As we have already noted, that is anathema to
74
capitalism's requirement for predictable risk.
Second, the doctrine of privity in contracts is seldom applied to
75
situations involving more than a very small number of potential parties.
The questions it typically resolves are whether there was a contract
between A and B, or between A, B, and C. As a result, there is relatively
little risk involved in leaving questions of offer and acceptance to a
jury. 76 The range of possible outcomes is already so heavily
70. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 272 (1859).
71. Id. at 272, 275.
72. See David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1672
(2007) (denoting the four elements of negligence).

73.
at 32-34.
74.
75.
76.

Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 443-47 (N.Y. 1931); Zipursky, supra note 69,
Zipursky, supra note 69, at 34-35.
See UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 445.
See id. at 444.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss4/4

12

Kaye: The Identity Criterion: Resuscitating a Cardozian, Relational App
THE IDENTITY CRITERION

2021]

957

circumscribed that the risks associated with unpredictability have
already been significantly mitigated.
As the auditor example illustrates, however, when it comes to duty
of care in negligence, the stakes are often much higher, because the
potential parties could number in the thousands or even millions." This
is clearly the indeterminacy problem writ large. Decisions about whether
a duty of care exists cannot, therefore, be left to a jury. On the contrary,
duty must be decided by the judge as a matter of law.
III.
A.

THE CARDOZO CASES

Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.

Now that we have established the purpose and role of the doctrine
of duty of care in negligence, we can move on to consider how Chief
Judge Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals sought to
implement it. We shall start, naturally enough, with Palsgrafv. Long
Island RailroadCo. 8 While it is the one torts case that every American
lawyer claims to remember, the memory often plays tricks, especially
when it comes to recalling what the judges did and did not say. So it is
worth spending a little time initially to go over what should be familiar
ground.
After buying a ticket to Rockaway Beach, Mrs. Palsgraf was
standing on a platform of the Long Island Railroad. 79 A train stopped at
the station, bound for a different destination. As it began to pull away, a
man carrying a package tried to jump aboard. 80 He succeeded after a
fashion but appeared unsteady as if about to fall. "A guard on the car,
who had held the door open, reached forward to help him in, and another
guard on the platform pushed him from behind." 81 This caused the
package, wrapped in newspaper, to fall. It turned out that it contained
fireworks, which then exploded. 82 The shock of the explosion caused
some scales to fall at the other end of the platform, where they struck
Mrs. Palsgraf.83
She sued the railroad to recover compensation for her injuries.
Writing on behalf of a majority of the New York Court of Appeals,
Cardozo began-as should be expected after the discussion in Part II77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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by quoting Chief Judge McSherry of the Court of Appeals of Maryland:
"In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given
act, . .. must be sought and found a duty to the individual

complaining."84
He then proceeded to consider whether Mrs. Palsgraf had been
owed such a duty, but held that: "The conduct of the defendant's guard,
if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in
its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not
negligence at all." 85
Quoting Sir Frederick Pollock, he added: "Proof of negligence in
the air, so to speak, will not do." 86 Nor could it be claimed that a duty is
87
owed to one person simply because it is owed to another. Since Mrs.
Palsgraf sued "in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as
88
the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another," and since "no
hazard was apparent ... with reference to her, [the act] did not take to
itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong .. . with
reference to some one else." 89 "What the plaintiff must show is 'a
wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of her own right, and not merely a
wrong to some one else." 90 That she had failed to do. As a consequence,
she was held to have been owed no duty of care by the Railroad, and her
claim was dismissed. 91
So how could Mrs. Palsgraf have established that the Railroad
92
owed a duty to her "in her own right[?]" Cardozo's answer was that:
"The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and
risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension." 93 And again: "Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of
relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart from things related, is surely
94
not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all." As Professor Cardi has
noted, such terminology has meant that "Palsgrafis most commonly
95
cited for the idea that duty is 'relational."'
84.
1903)).
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 99-100 (citing W. Va. Cent. & Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. State, 54 A. 669, 671-72 (Md.
Id. at 99.
Id. (quoting SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTs 455 (11th ed., 1920)).
See id. at 99-101.
Id. at 99-100.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 99-101.
92. Id. at 100.
93. Id. at 100-101.
94. Id. at 99-101.
95. See Cardi, supra note 20, at 1875-86 (quoting John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1819 (1998)).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss4/4

14

Kaye: The Identity Criterion: Resuscitating a Cardozian, Relational App

THE IDENTITY CRITERION

2021 ]

959

After the discussion in Part II, this should come as no surprise. We
saw there that, within the law of negligence, duty of care has twin roles
to play: the determination of whether or not any duty exists at all and, if
so, to whom. 96 And we also saw that these roles have been successfully
filled in the law of contracts by the doctrine of privity. 97 So it is surely to
be expected that Cardozo sought to develop duty in negligence law in a
manner analogous to privity in contracts. He therefore focused on the
existence or otherwise of a relevant relationship. 98
In this context, "relevance" means that the relationship is concerned
with the type of interest that was ultimately harmed by the defendant's
negligence, whether that be bodily security, or some property or
financial asset. 99 But while Cardi is certainly right to say that Palsgraf
has been treated as the "centerpiece of academic tort theory," 100 it was
not the first case in which Cardozo argued that duty is relational. In fact,
he had made the same point in both Glanzer v. Shepard101 (decided six
years earlier) and in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,102 where
he pronounced judgment just over a month before the Palsgrafappeal
was heard.
B.

H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.

In Moch, the relevant facts were as follows. Rensselaer Water
contracted to supply water to a city and its inhabitants. 103 While this
contract was in force, a building caught fire, and the fire spread to
Moch's warehouse.104 The warehouse and its contents were destroyed,
so Moch sued Rensselaer for negligently failing to supply a sufficient
amount of water to save them. 105 Cardozo explained the issue thus:
"What we need to know is not so much the conduct to be avoided when
the relation and its attendant duty are established as existing . .. [w]hat
we need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation." 106 In other
words, the issue at stake was whether a relevant relationship had been
established between Rensselaer and Moch.

96. See supra Part II.A.
97.

See supra Part

IIA-B.

98. See, e.g., Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99-101.
99. See id.
100.

See Cardi, supra note 20, at 1875.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 898.
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Cardozo rejected Moch's argument that Rensselaer was brought
into such a relation with everyone who might potentially benefit from
the supply of water at the moment that the contract with the city was
created.1 07 That would mean that everyone who makes a promise in a
contract would be under a duty not merely to the promisee but also to an
08
"indefinite number" of potential beneficiaries.1 "The assumption of one
relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new
relations, inescapably hooked together."109 That would be to go too
far.' 10 As in Palsgraf, therefore, Cardozo held that the plaintiff had been
owed no duty of care.'"
Once again, this decision should come as no surprise. As we saw in
Part II, the law cannot recognize an indefinite number of potential
plaintiffs because that would mean the running of an indeterminate
risk." 2 In the absence of a relationship between Moch and Rensselaer
that was qualitatively different from any that the latter had with the
public at large, there could be no question of the law recognizing a duty
of care.
C.

Glanzer v. Shepard

In Glanzer v. Shepard, however, the outcome was rather
different." 3 Glanzer agreed to buy 905 bags of beans from Bech, Van
Siclen & Co. for a price to be determined by the total weight of the
5
Bech
beans." 4 The weight was to be certified by public weighers.'
retained Shepard, who were such weighers, to carry out the weighing of
its commodities." 6 Bech then sent a letter informing Shepard that the
bags of beans were on the dock, ready to be weighed, and that the beans
had been sold to Glanzer."? Shepard accordingly weighed the beans and
118
sent a certified copy of the weight sheets to Glanzer.
After paying for, and taking possession of, the beans, on the basis
of the certified weight, Glanzer then sought to resell them. But it was
discovered that the beans actually weighed 11,854 pounds less than the
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928).
See supra Part II.A.
135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 275.
Id.
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amount that was certified in the sheets." 9 Glanzer sued Shepard for
negligence in carrying out the weighing. 120 The trial judge ordered
judgment for Glanzer for the amount overpaid. 121 After two appeals, the
matter came before the New York Court of Appeals. 12 2
Giving judgment on behalf of a near-unanimous court, Judge
Cardozo (as he then was) held that the law imposed on Shepard not
merely a duty in contracts towards Bech, but also a duty in torts towards
Glanzer. 123 On the face of it, this result might seem inconsistent with
Palsgrafand Moch. Indeed, precisely that criticism has been leveled by
Professor Keith Hylton, who has suggested that Cardozo sometimes took
what he calls a "broad" approach and ruled for the plaintiff, yet
sometimes took a "narrow" approach and ruled for the defendant. 124 But
closer analysis reveals that there was one highly significant difference in
the facts that led to Glanzer being decided differently from Palsgrafand
Moch. So let us proceed step-by-step through Cardozo's reasoning
process.
First, he noted that the plaintiffs' use of the certificates was "not an
indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers," 12 s but
"the end and aim of the transaction." 126 In addition, Shepard "sent a copy
[of the weight sheets] to the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing
action."1 27 In other words, Shepard not only knew the identity of the
party (Glanzer), who would be purchasing the beans in reliance on the
weight sheets, but they had actually dealt directly with Glanzer in
sending them those very sheets. As Cardozo put it: "In such
circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing was the assumption
of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose conduct was to
be governed."1 28 Naturally, that included the buyer, whose payment was
based on the weight certified. And finally, tying this back to the concept
of relationship, Cardozo explained: "We do not need to state the duty in

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275-77.

124.

Keith N. Hylton, New PrivateLaw Theory and Tort Law: A Comment, 125 HARV. L. REV.

F. 173, 175 nn.8-10 (2011-12). One of the cases he cites to support his claim is Pokora v. Wabash
Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). But that is a case about standardof care-not duty of care-and so
need not be addressed here. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934). For further
discussion regarding the broad versus narrow scope of Cardozo's opinions, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 113 (1990).

125. Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 275.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 276.
128. Id.
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terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has none the
less an origin not exclusively contractual. Given the contract and the
12 9
relation, the duty is imposed by law."
There was a fundamental difference in the facts of Glanzer as
compared to those of Palsgraf and Moch. In Moch, Cardozo was
concerned that the defendant might be liable to an "indefinite number"
0
In Palsgraf, he was concerned that the
of potential beneficiaries.
defendant could be liable to a whole crowd as a result of jostling just one
of its number.131 But those problems did not exist in Glanzer. There
could only ever be one buyer who relied upon the certified weight
sheets, and the weighers themselves had been in direct contact with that
very party. 3 2 Thus, there was every reason for Shepard to owe Glanzer a
duty of care.
Indeed, Shepard knew Glanzer's identity, just as much as if there
133
In the subsequent case of
had been a contract between the parties.
Ultramares v. Touche, Cardozo made this point expressly, as he
explained the outcome in Glanzer on the basis that there was an
4
"intimacy [in] the resulting nexus"13 that was "so close as to approach
13 5
that of privity, if not completely one with it."
D.

Ultramares Corp. v. Touche

Which brings us to the case of Ultramaresv. Touche itself: a case
that, for some reason, is too often overlooked. Yet, Ultramares is a case
of great significance for several reasons. Coming more than three years
after Palsgraf, it is the last of five cases in the New York Court of
13 6
Appeals in which Cardozo addressed the question of duty of care. By
that time, Cardozo had had plenty of time to ponder upon Palsgrafand
its reception, and so he was in pole position to modify, correct, or refine
what he had said.
As it happens, he took the opportunity to expand upon his reasons
for insisting that the criterion for deciding whether or not a duty of care
is established depends on the existence (or lack thereof) of a relevant

129. Id. (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390 (1916)) (emphasis added).
130. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928).
131. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) ("One who jostles one's
neighbor in a crowd does not invade the rights of others standing at the outer fringe.").

132. Glanzer, 35 N.E. at 275.
133. Id.
134. 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931).
135. Id. at 446.
136. See supra Part II. The others are Moch, Glanzer, and Palsgraf(all of which have already
been discussed).
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relationship.137 He also re-emphasized points he had made earlier, in
both Glanzer and Moch, in a manner that provides us with a definitive
means of determining whether a relevant relationship exists. 138 And he
also made more explicit a wrinkle that he had previously only hinted at
in Palsgrafthat such relationships are irrelevant when the tort at stake is
not negligence, but fraud.13 9
So let us now acquaint ourselves with the facts of Ultramares. In
January 1924, accountants Touche were employed by Fred Stern & Co.
to audit and certify Stem's balance sheet.14 0 After completing the audit,
Touche supplied Stem with thirty-two certified copies as counterpart
originals. "Nothing was said as to the persons to whom these
counterparts would be shown or the extent or number of the transactions
in which they would be used."141 But Touche knew that they would be
used by Stem as the basis for negotiating loans and terms of credit from
third parties, 4 2 and Ultramares subsequently made Stem a substantial
loan in reliance on one of the certified copies.143
Stem was, in fact, insolvent, but the books had been falsified by the
inclusion of accounts receivable and other assets that did not actually
exist." Ultramares inevitably lost its money. Realizing (because of
Stem's lack of funds) that any action for breach of contract against Stern
would be pointless, Ultramares chose instead to sue Touche on the
grounds that the latter had either committed negligence in failing to
uncover the fraud or else had colluded in the fraud itself.4 5
The trial judge allowed the negligence allegation to go to the jury,
who found for Ultramares.1 4 6 On appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals, and on behalf of a unanimous court, Chief Judge Cardozo held:
"We think the evidence supports a finding that the audit was negligently
made." 147 But he followed that declaration immediately with the
ominous qualification that "we put aside for the moment the question
whether negligence, even if it existed, was a wrong to the plaintiff." 148
As with Mrs. Palsgraf, whether Ultramares could ultimately succeed in

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 444-46.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442-43.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443, 450.
Id. at 443.
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its claim was dependent on whether it could show that the defendant had
owed it a duty of care.
Cardozo's reasoning in Ultramares started from an uncontroversial
summary of well-established contract law: "The defendants owed to
their employer ... a duty growing out of contract to make it with the
care and caution proper to their calling." 149 The question for him-as the
discussion in Part II of this Article would lead us to expect-was how to
150
translate such a duty into negligence law.
Cardozo was no King Canute.151 He was not one for resisting
change to the law when there was (in his view) good reason for it. 152 He
was well aware that the "assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding
in these days apace" 5 3 so that "today the beneficiary of a promise,
4
clearly designated as such, is seldom left without a remedy.""
Cardozo's point, nevertheless, was that such a beneficiary still had to be
"clearly designated as such,"155 so that they would still be identifiable by
the parties to the contract. There had to be a way to tie a contractual
56
promise "directly to the individual members of the public."'
Indeed, he emphasized that "[s]omething more" is always required
beyond establishing that a promise is for the benefit of the public as a
whole or for that of "a class of indefinite extension."157 In order to be
owed a duty of care in negligence law, therefore, Ultramares had to be
158
identifiable by Touche at the time when the audit report was finalized.
Cardozo had, after all, applied precisely that approach in Glanzer
where, finding that the plaintiff was indeed identifiable by the defendant,
159
Ultramares, on
he had held that the plaintiff was owed a duty of care.
as
to the persons
said
was
"Nothing
identifiable:
not
was
hand,
the other
there was
particular
In
....
to whom [the] counterparts would be shown
no mention of the plaintiff, ... which till then had never made advances
to the Stern Company .... »"0
149. Id. at 444.
150.

See id.; see also supra Part II.

151. King Canute is generally remembered as a king who believed that he was so powerful that
he could successfully order the tide to recede. Ironically, the story on which this is based actually
records him as demonstrating his humility by showing that he could not turn back the tide. But it is
likely that the story is apocryphal in any event.
152. Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 444.
153. Id. at 445.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 445 (quoting H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y.
1928)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 442.
159. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276-77 (N.Y. 1922).
160. UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 442.
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Recognizing a duty of care owed to Ultramares in such
circumstances would thus mean that anyone who had relied on Touche's
audit report would be able to bring a claim.' 6 1 As we know from Part II,
the law simply cannot countenance such a prospect if the defendant was
not in a position to identify those victims in advance: "If liability for
negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder ... may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms [would be] so extreme .... "162
Accordingly, Ultramares was held to have been owed no duty of
care in negligence.1 63 It should be noted, however, that Cardozo did not
deny outright the possibility of the law of negligence recognizing the
duty of an auditor in favor of a third party. What he did deny was that
there could be such a duty if the auditor had no way of knowing the
identity of that third party in advance."
E.

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.

MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.1 65 was a very different case. It was
actually decided before any of the other four cases already discussed in
this Part, and it was also the only one to revolve around a defective
product.'" It seems clear that lawyers of the time (including Cardozo
himself) implicitly believed that products involved different
considerations from statements.1 67 Thus, in both Glanzer and Mochcases about statements-Cardozo cited only cases about statements;1 68
while, in Macpherson, he cited only cases about products.1 69
The facts of MacPherson were as follows. Buick sold a car to a
dealer, who then sold it on to Macpherson. While it was being driven,
one of the wheels collapsed, causing Macpherson to be ejected and
injured.' The wheel had not been made by Buick, but had been

161. Id. at 444.
162. Id.; see supra Part II.
163. UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 450.
164. See White v. Guarente, 372 N.E.2d. 315, 317 (N.Y. 1977).
165. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
166. See id. at 1051.
167. Compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922); H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928), with id.
168. It might be tempting to think that cases like Glanzer and Ultramares Corp. were really
about services rather than statements. But Cardozo rejected that contention, stating: "The service

may have been rendered as carefully as you please, and its quality will count for nothing if there
was negligence thereafter in distributing the summary." Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 446.
169. See generallyMacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051-54 (citing only to cases about products).
170. Id. at 1054.
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purchased from a wheel manufacturer.' 7 ' The evidence suggested,
however, that the defect would have been discovered if Buick had
72
carried out a reasonable inspection before selling the vehicle.1' So
Macpherson sued Buick for negligence.
As in Moch, Glanzer, and Ultramares, Macpherson involved the
73
question of whether the defendant owed "a duty of care and vigilance"'
to anyone other than the party with whom the defendant had a
contract. 7 4 Again giving judgment on behalf of a near-unanimous court,
75
Judge Cardozo (as he then was) held that it did. He stressed that a
76
defective car is dangerous,1' that Buick had sold the car to a buyer
77
whom it knew "was a dealer in cars, who bought to resell,"' and that it
also knew that "the car would be used by persons other than the buyer.
78
This was apparent from its size; there were seats for three persons."
So Buick did indeed owe a duty to Macpherson.
Of course, the discussions above of Moch, Glanzer, and Ultramares
suggest that Cardozo subsequently realized that knowledge that one's
work would be relied on by others should not be enough to establish that
the defendant owes a duty of care to those "others" unless the defendant
could also have identified who they were. Yet there was no way for
Buick to know of Macpherson's identity in advance.1 79 At first blush,
Cardozo's judgment in Macpherson might appear to be anomalous, or at
least an initial stab at tackling the issues posed by duty of care while
Cardozo's thoughts were still at an embryonic stage.
Yet, whether embryonic or not, Cardozo's judgment in Macpherson
highlighted issues that he subsequently addressed again in Ultramares.
In the latter case, Cardozo was concerned to avoid the possibility of an
80
"indeterminate class" of potential plaintiffs.1 But that hardly presented
much of a problem in Macpherson because the car involved only had
"seats for three persons."1 8 1
It is, of course, true that there was no way for Buick to know in
advance whether the car would be carrying one, two, or three
individuals, and so the number of potential plaintiffs was, if taken
literally, still indeterminate. But we also recognized in Part II that the
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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law can seldom develop a doctrine where the outcome will always be
known with 100% certainty. Instead, it strives to transform the wholly
indeterminable into something that can be predicted with a high degree
of confidence." 2 Part II also explained that duty attempts to play a role
in negligence law that privity already plays in the law of contracts; and
we have noted how, in Ultramares, Cardozo used privity as a model for
duty of care.' 8 3 It is surely understandable that he should have had no
qualms about finding the existence of a duty in Macpherson, where the
largest possible number of parties involved-four: Buick, plus three
potential riders in the car-could never have been greater than the
number of parties typically found in many commercial contracts.' 84
The real issue that Macpherson raises is not one of inconsistency of
approach. It is much more about whether Cardozo's method of applying
his approach was correct. More specifically, it raises the question of
whether he was correct that a situation that could never involve more
than three plaintiffs (Macpherson) was sufficient to establish a duty of
care, while a scenario that could never involve more than 32 plaintiffs
(Ultramares)was not. We shall return to this question in Part V.'85
F.

Summary

At this stage, it is perhaps worth taking a little time to summarize
what we have now managed to establish about Benjamin Cardozo's
approach to duty of care in negligence. Perhaps a list of bullet-points
will make this clearer:
* The law of contracts has the doctrine of privity (supplemented by the
notion of being an identified third-party beneficiary) to identify and
delimit the number of parties who may sue or be sued.
* The law of negligence needs to develop a doctrine to perform a
similar task for, without it, there is the risk of liability to an
"indeterminate class" of potential plaintiffs.
* The doctrine of duty of care is best suited to this task because it
raises a question of law for the judge rather than a question of fact for

the jury.
* A duty will be owed by the defendant to the plaintiff if those parties
had a relevant relationship with each other at the time of the
defendant's conduct, and that relationship was significantly closer than
any relationship that the defendant might have had with the general

public.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.C; Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 445, 448.
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
See infra Part V.
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" Such a relationship exists whenever the defendant is in a position to
identify the plaintiff as a potential victim at the time when the tort
occurred (because this is analogous to there being either contractual
privity between the parties or a relationship between the defendant and
a third-party beneficiary).
* Such a relationship will also exist whenever there is a clearly
identified class of potential victims, if that class is no larger than the
number of parties typically to be found in a contract.

G.

What Cardozo DidNot Say

It is, however, just as important to emphasize what Cardozo did not
say. For some reason, both scholars and practitioners have been all too
ready to put words into his mouth-and have then confused
themselves. 186 So let us point out the three largest red herrings: the
things that Cardozo is supposed to have said but actually did not.
* None of this analysis has anything to do with proximate cause or
scope of liability. On the contrary, it is all a matter of duty designed
precisely to enable judges to rule on the issue as a matter of law.
" Nothing in Cardozo's analysis uses foreseeability as a test of duty.
" There is nothing in any of Cardozo's analysis to suggest that the
search for a relevant relationship should be confined to potential
connections between the plaintiff and the direct tortfeasor.
Before we go on to develop a Cardozo-inspired relational framework
for duty of care within the law of negligence, it is worth examining these
red herrings in more detail in order to ensure that they do not erroneously
87
contaminate our approach. So it is to them that we now turn.1

IV.

A.

THREE RED HERRINGS

Proximate Cause/Scope ofLiability

Probably the most baffling red herring is that, as Professor
Benjamin Zipursky has pointed out, "Palsgraf is predominantly
treated-at least by scholars-as a 'proximate cause' case."' 8 8 It is
186. See infra Part IV.
187. See infra Part IV.
188. Zipursky, supra note 69, at 11 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 284-90 (5th ed. 1984)); DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS
AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 210
(3d ed. 1997); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 513 (6th ed. 1995); MARC
A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 376-
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baffling because not only did Cardozo quote with evident approval Chief
Judge McSherry's assertion that "in every instance, before negligence
can be predicated of a given act, ... must be sought and found a duty to
the individual complaining"; 8 9 but he also declared expressly: "The law
of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before
uS." 190

Professor Keith Hylton has, nevertheless, attempted to argue that
Cardozo was being disingenuous because: "The first thing to say is that
Palsgrafis obviously a case about proximate cause." 191 But that's an
utterly hopeless argument. Professor Hylton would surely never accept
such unsupported assertions from his own students. Indeed, how on
earth is it "obviously" about proximate cause when Cardozo himself-a
man known for choosing his words very carefully-said expressly that it
was about duty?1 92 Hylton's answer is that "the way to understand
Palsgrafis to see that it was a power play. Chief Judge Cardozo took a
question away from the jury, weakening the jury and enhancing the
power of the judge. The reason for doing so was to create greater
certainty in the law."1 93
Of course Cardozo wanted to create greater certainty! He was, after
all, one of the founders of the American Law Institute, whose very
purpose was to promote greater consistency and predictability in the
law.1 94 But a high degree of predictability is essential for the
development of negligence law.1 95 In historical terms, therefore, Cardozo
had little choice. If he had not emphasized the role of duty in Palsgraf, a
judge in a subsequent case would undoubtedly have done so instead.
Indeed, the history of the treatment of duty in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts suggests that that is precisely what happened.1 96 As my
colleague, Peter Lake, pointed out some years ago: "[U]nder the
Restatement (Second) of Torts' approach to negligence, unlike
for ... Cardozo, duty is not an element of the cause of action for
81 (6th ed. 1996); JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 304 (9th ed. 1994).
189. w. va. Central R. Co. v. State, 96 Md. 652, 671-72 (Md. 1903).
190. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
191. See Hylton, supra note 124, at 176.
192. Otto Stockmeyer, Beloved Storytellers (Part Two): Cardozo's Opinion Style, COOLEY L.
SCH., https://info.cooley.edu/blog/beloved-storytellers-part-two-cardozos-opinion-style (last visited
Aug. 1, 2021).
193. Hylton, supra note 124, at 177.
194. Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC.

1(1923).
195. See infra Part v.A.
196. See Lake, supra note 65, at 1515.
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negligence," 97 yet this "featherlight treatment of duty .. . has been
superseded and eclipsed by modern decisional law."198
B.

Foreseeability

Hylton tries to extricate himself from the confusion of his own
making by adding: "Proximate cause typically involves an inquiry into
foreseeability, as a necessary condition for liability. Chief Judge
199
But that
Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion is an analysis of foreseeability."
does
cause
proximate
while
fact,
In
more.
even
just confuses matters
"typically involve[] an inquiry into foreseeability," Cardozo's judgment
2 00
Indeed, the word
in Palsgrafdoes not analyze foreseeability at all.
"foreseeability" does not appear anywhere in his judgment (and nor does
any other verbal form with the same stem).
It is very clear why not-Cardozo was not talking about proximate
cause at all, but about duty. Instead, it was Judge Andrews in his dissent
20 1
But that was because his
who discussed the role of foreseeability.
argument was precisely that Palsgrafshould be decided as a matter of
proximate cause !202
It might be objected that, while Cardozo did not explicitly use the
language of foreseeability, he was nevertheless focused on analyzing the
concept. But that is a strange argument to make about a noted stylist like
Cardozo. If he had truly "analyzed" the concept in Palsgraf; he would
have explored the concept in some depth, and would surely have
employed a variety of synonyms (including "foreseeability") to avoid
monotonous repetition, especially as Judge Andrews did indeed use that
word.2 03 But Cardozo did nothing of the sort. Moreover, there is also
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1504.
199. See Hylton, supra note 124, at 176. Of course, Hylton is not alone in this error. As he
points out, most textbook writers consider Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion to be an analysis of
foreseeability. Id. (first citing W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf Modern Duty
Law in Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1874 (2011)); and then citing wILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 254-60 (4th eds. 1971)) ("[T]orts textbooks cover the case in the
chapter on proximate cause. Prosser's torts hornbook discusses Palsgrafin the chapter on proximate
cause.").

200. See Hylton, supra note 124, at 176.
201. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J. dissenting)
("[T]he results which a prudent man would or should foresee - do have a bearing upon the decision
as to proximate cause.").
202. Andrews argued that duty was not an issue because everyone is automatically owed such
a duty as a corollary of being a member of civil society. Id. at 102 ("Due care is a duty imposed on
each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger."). Id. at 103 ("Everyone owes to the
world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of
others.").

203. Compare id. at 100-01, with id. at 102-04.
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absolutely nothing in his judgment in Glanzer that hints remotely at
foreseeability, while the only time he mentioned it in either Moch or
Ultramareswas in relation to intentionaltorts. 2 04
1. Relationships vs. Foreseeability
In fact, the closest Cardozo came in Palsgrafto arguing for any role
for foreseeability is to be found in the following passage: "The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension." 20 Yet this passage does not support any interpretation
that foreseeability is about duty. On the contrary, the "risk reasonably to
be perceived" 206 (that is, reasonable foreseeability) is not there being
treated as the means of establishinga duty but as the way to "define[] the
duty to be obeyed." 2 07 Definition is not a matter of existence, but of
meaning. Someone who provides the definition of "beer" does not
thereby establish that there is a glass full of it on the countertop. But, if
there is a glass of liquid, the definition will help establish whether the
liquid in question is beer or not.
In other words, Cardozo was talking there not about duty, but about
the scope of a duty (known in his day as proximate cause), if such a duty
exists. 208 That this was Cardozo's point is made all the clearer by a later
sentence in the same paragraph: "The range of reasonable apprehension
is at times a question for the court, and at times, if varying inferences are
possible, a question for the jury." 209 This could not possibly be true if the
question being decided were that of duty. For duty is always a matter of
law decided by the court. 21 0 What Cardozo was, in fact, explaining was
simply that scope/proximate cause is a question of fact for a jury to
determine, except when only one inference may be drawn, in which case
the court will decide the issue as a matter of law. 21
The truth is simply that, as we have already seen, Cardozo's
analysis-not just in Palsgraf; but in several other leading cases-was
focused on identifying a relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant that could justify a court holding that the defendant owed to
204. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928); Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931) ("Foresight of these possibilities may charge with
liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it will charge with liability for negligence.").
205. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
206. Id.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. See id.
209. Id. at 101.
210.

See Lake, supra note 65, at 1512.

211.

See Palsgraf; 162 N.E. at 100-01.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2021

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [2021], Art. 4

972

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:945

the plaintiff a duty of care.2 12 Relationships do not imply
foreseeability. 213 A couple's marriage, for example, is not a matter of
foreseeability. Nor is a relationship of parenthood, or that of child,
sibling, or grandparent. Whether a person cohabits in the same
household-typically required for the household test of duty in
emotional distress cases 2 14-has nothing to do with foreseeability either.
Nor is the existence of a contractual relationship or fiduciary duty a
matter of foreseeability.
Indeed, the New York courts have made it abundantly clear that
215
By 1983, for
foreseeability is not the criterion for establishing a duty.
to quote
able
was
example, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
2 16
numerous declarations to this effect : "Foreseeability should not be
confused with duty." 217 "[T]he foreseeability factor is not determinative
of the issue." 218 Were foreseeability the sole factor in determining the
duty owed, "[i]t would extend endlessly, like the rippling of the
waters .. . to all who suffered injury or economic loss caused by the
absence of electrical power."219 "Mere foreseeability without relation
0
cannot suffice." 22
2. Last Train to Rockaway Beach
Palsgrafitself provides an excellent illustration of this point. For,
in fact, the Long Island Railroad could have foreseen that its
negligence-or that of its employees-might harm Mrs. Palsgraf. After
all, she had just bought a ticket from them and was standing on their
station platform at the time of the accident. If foreseeability were really
the touchstone of duty, then the Railroad would have owed her a duty.
Then the guards' behavior in pushing and pulling the passenger onto the
moving train might have amounted to a breach of that duty that caused
her harm, and she could have won her case.
But she did not win because foreseeability was not the criterion
2 21
Mrs.
employed to establish duty. That criterion was relationship.
212. See, e.g., id.
213. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 820, 826-27 (Cal. 1989).
214. See, e.g., id. at 829-30.
215. See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 469 N.Y.S.2d 948, 951 (App. Div. 1983); Pulka v.
Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022-23 (N.Y. 1976); Beck v. FMC Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958
(App. Div. 1976); Cullen v. BMW of North America, 531 F. Supp. 555, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
216. Strauss, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
217. Pulka, 358 N.E.2d at 1022-23.
218. Beck, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
219. Id.
220. Cullen, 531 F. Supp. at 563.
221. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 182 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 1928).
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Palsgraf had bought a ticket to Rockaway Beach, so the relevant
relationship with the Railroad revolved around her journey to that
destination. If she had suffered an injury while taking that journey, then
the Railroad could potentially have been liable because it would then
have owed her a duty. But the passenger carrying the fireworks had been
attempting to board a train for a different destination, and Mrs. Palsgraf
had no relationship with the Railroad in that regard. So any wrongful
conduct by the Railroad's guards could not amount to a breach of the
Railroad's duty to her because it owed her no such duty in the first
place. 222
The simple fact is that relationship and foreseeability are two
distinct concepts. They are not interrelated in the way that has so often
been assumed. The most that can be said of foreseeability in this context
is that it provides an underlying moral justification for the use of
relationality to determine duty. 223 But if there is one single reason why
"duty cases [are] frustratingly inconsistent, unfocused, and often
nonsensical,"2 2 it is surely this thoroughly misplaced emphasis on
foreseeability.
C.

Discrete Relationships

The third mistaken interpretation of Cardozo's judgment in
Palsgrafis of a rather different order. Those who have pursued this
particular red herring understand perfectly well that Cardozo applied a
relationality requirement to determine whether a duty of care had been
established. They also appreciate that this essentially involves an inquiry
into whether a relationship somewhat akin to contractual privity existed
between plaintiff and defendant at the time the tort took place. The
problem is that they have focused almost entirely on the singular
relationship between two parties: the plaintiff and the direct tortfeasor. 25
Yet, as Dean Leon Green pointed out over half a century ago: "Cases
involving injures to relations are three-partysituations."226

222. Id. at 99.
223.

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94-95, 110, 130-31 (1881).

224.

See Cardi, supra note 20, at 1875.

225.

See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Does Tort Law Have a Future?,34 VAL. U. L. REV. 561, 561-

63 (2000). "The significance of these cases is that they articulate the bipolarity of the relationship
between the doer and the sufferer of negligent injury." Id.
226. LEON GREEN ET AL., CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS ix (1968) (emphasis added).
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1. Corrective Justice Theory
2 7
Corrective justice theorists are the main offenders in this regard.
Borrowing heavily on the philosophy of Aristotle, they argue that the
228
that
main function of tort law is to restore the "moral equilibrium"
pay
tortfeasor
the
having
by
existed before the tort was committed
229
appropriate compensation to the victim.
The notion of "restoring the moral equilibrium" is highly
problematic because it presupposes that (a) there was a moral
equilibrium before the tort occurred; and (b) that it is capable of being
restored.23 0 For current purposes, however, we can pass over such
metaphysics and focus on a more practical-and, indeed, fundamentalproblem. For it is hardly ever the case that the actual tortfeasor meets the
23 1
cost of any compensation awarded to the victim. Instead, it is typically
either the tortfeasor's employer or-in the vast majority of cases-a
liability insurer who pays the compensation. The direct tortfeasor very
seldom does anything at all to restore any "moral equilibrium. "232
Corrective justice simply cannot account for the doctrine of
vicarious liability, according to which one person-typically an
23 3
employer-is made liable for a tort committed by another. This flaw
in application exposes something fundamentally wrong with the theory:
234
it focuses exclusively on the relationship between "sufferer and doer" :
victim and direct tortfeasor. As a result, as Professor Ernest Weinrib,
one of its leading proponents, has admitted, corrective justice can
account for vicarious liability "only if the employer can, in some sense,
235
Weinrib has argued that this is
be regarded as a doer of the harm."
precisely how we should conceive of a tort when committed by an
employee within the course of their employment because, in his view,
persona,
inclusive
legal
a
more
constructs
"the
law
can
responsibility
whom
to
the-employer-acting-through-the-employee,
23 6
be ascribed."

227.
228.

See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 37, 44 (2012).
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK V 121 (M. Ostwald trans., 1962).

229. William H. Pedrick, Does Tort Law Have a Future?, 39 OHIO STATE L.J. 782, 786
(1978).
230. ARISTOTLE, supra note 228, at 121.
231. Pedrick, supra note 229, at 786.
232.
233.

ARISTOTLE, supra note 228, at 121.
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 186 (1995).

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 187.
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But this is just fanciful fiction. A corporate employer cannot in any
sense inspect vehicles,23 7 weigh beans, 238 write reports 239-or, indeed,
push and pull passengers onto departing trains. 240 So this argument falls
at the first hurdle. As Professor Catharine Wells once said:
Ultimately, the problem with a formal account of corrective justice is
that it does not conform to the practical realities of legal arrangements.
The law must be reflexive and responsible to the needs of human life,
and thus its substance cannot be reduced to the inflexible requirements
of an a priori moral system. 24 1

As Wells also said, it is clearly better to locate analysis of the law "in a
non-fictional world and address[] it in terms that are both practical and
real." 242 After all, "we do not believe in fairy tales anymore." 243 Once we
address reality, it is apparent that corrective justice fails for another
reason too. For if it really were the employer performing the act, then the
plaintiff should be able to sue only the employer. But that is not how tort
law works at all. In fact, the plaintiff can sue both the employer (as
vicariously liable) and the employee (as directly liable). 24 Once again,
therefore, corrective justice simply fails to capture the real world of the
law of torts. As Weinrib has put it, corrective justice is "bipolar" 24 5_
focused on just the two parties of "doer and sufferer" 246-when what is
needed is a multi-relational approach.
2. Civil Recourse Theory
Recognizing some of the deficiencies in corrective justice theory,
Zipursky developed a modified form of it that he calls "civil recourse
theory." 247 Whereas corrective justice theory holds that a tort
immediately puts the tortfeasor under an obligation to make up for such
wrongdoing, civil recourse theory sees a tort as generating a right for the

237. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916).
238. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922).
239. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 450 (N.Y. 1931).
240. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
241.

Catharine P. Wells, Corrective Justice and Corporate Tort Liability, 69

S. CAL.

L. REV.

1769, 1776 (1996).
242. Id. at 1780.
243. Lord Reid, The Judgeas Lawmaker, 12 J. Soc. PUB. TCHRS. L. 22, 22 (1972).
244.

While suing the employee as well as the employer is not particularly common, it certainly

does happen. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. v. Crocker, 246
245. Weinrib, supra note 225, at 561.
246. Id. at 562.
247.

S.W.3d 603, 604

(Tex. 2008).

Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 734-37

(2003).
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2 48
This improves upon
victim to seek redress through the courts.
that a plaintiff is able
only
not
explains
it
that
in
theory
corrective justice
to restore the status
compensation
just
to seek several remedies, and not
quo ante, but that they will be unable to obtain any remedy if they are
unsuccessful in a civil suit (or simply fail to bring such an action at

all). 249
But there is no reason to adopt civil recourse theory to be able to
account for those features. Indeed, it may be said that the theory raises
more questions than it answers, for it provides no criteria for deciding
which remedies may be pursued by a plaintiff (nor in what
circumstances). It just paints a picture in which a successful plaintiff is
able to inflict pain and suffering on a defendant, as if the law is prepared
to endorse almost any such conduct. That is, of course, very far from the
0

truth.25
The problem is that civil recourse theory remains just as trapped
within the confines of the bipolar relationship between "sufferer and
doer" as corrective justice theory. Indeed, it seems to take for granted
that it is that relationship-and only that relationship-that matters. So it
focuses on the legal process on which a plaintiff might embark, but has
nothing to offer in terms of explaining who either the plaintiff(s) or
defendant(s) might be. A truly relational approach is not so blinkered.
3. Relational Torts and Relational Contracts
At around the same time that Ultramareswas decided, Leon Green
21
He was keen for torts
had the germ of an idea of what was required.
in relations
throughout-"interests
plurals
the
on-note
scholars to focus
25 2
he and his
that
material
much
so
had
he
By 1968,
with other persons."
contents
whose
associates could even compile a book of cases on torts
253
In terms somewhat
were devoted solely to relational interests.
by the founder of
coined
solidarity
organic
of
concept
the
of
reminiscent
254
"[A]s the social
that:
adamant
was
Green
sociology, Emile Durkheim,
the core of its
as
order becomes more and more dependent on the group
existence, the importance of relations will increase and courts . . . will
248. Id. at 733-34.
249. Id. at 748-51.
250. I have previously outlined a sound taxonomy of remedies that explains precisely when
every remedy known to the civil law-and not just to the law of torts-is, or is not, available. See
Tim Kaye, A Sound Taxonomy ofRemedies, 36 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 79, 112-13 (2018).
251. LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES (1931).
252.
253.

254.

Green, supra note 13, at 462.
GREEN ET AL., supra note 28.
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 111-13 (W. D. Halls trans.

1997).
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find their efforts more and more devoted to the adjustment of relational
conflicts.""
By "relational conflicts," Green was certainly not taking the
narrow, bipolar approach of the relationship between "sufferer and
doer." 2 6 On the contrary, he remarked that, "in hurts to relational
interests, three parties must always be involved." 25 7 In other words,
relational conflicts involve someone else in addition to the primary
victim and direct tortfeasor, whether that third party be a vicariously
liable defendant or a secondary victim. 258 Indeed, it is perfectly possible
for more than three parties to be involved.
While Green's calls seem thus far to have gone unheeded within the
field of torts, Professor Stewart Macaulay later began to explore similar
themes within the field of contracts. He pointed out that there are many
"non-contractual" elements to a business relationship that fall outside of
the traditional purview of a contract. 2 9 As I have said before, these
relations may be divided into three types21:
* relations between the parties that go beyond the scope of the instant,
discrete contract;
* relations between contracting parties and third parties who will be
affected by the formation and performance (or lack thereof) of the
instant contract; and
* relations between the parties and an institution of the state. 261

The clear theme underlying each of these types of relationality is
that, whether they include additional terms or additional parties, they go
beyond the terms of the contract at hand between the named parties
because "every transaction is embedded in complex relations."262
Relational contract theory is thus at pains to include many relationships
outside the immediate, discrete contract, for even an apparently discrete
transaction has some relational aspects 263:
255.

GREEN ET AL., supra note 28.

256. Id.
257.

Green, supranote 13, at 462.

258. See id.
259. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOCIO. REv. 55, 58-60 (1963).
260. Tim Kaye, Torts as Relational Contracts, in SHAKING THE WORLD GENTLY: A
WEBFESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR ROBERT DALE BICKEL 273-74 (Tim Kaye ed., 2013).
261.

See Juliet P. Kostritsky, JudicialIncorporation of Trade Usages: A FunctionalSolution to

the Opportunism Problem, 39 CONN. L. REv. 451, 485-86 (2006).
262. Ian R. Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract Theory after a Neo-classicalSeminar,
in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 207,

208 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003) (emphasis in original).
263.

Ian R. Macneil,

Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under

Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 856-57 (1978).
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Many if not most contracts are heavily relational and intertwined, and
not discrete at all. People often deal with each other over long periods
of time, and when they do their present dealings are intertwined with
their previous actions, and their current understanding has many
2
open-ended terms and tag ends. 6

Yet what Green had said of the law of torts in 1934 continued to be true
decades later: "The value of the relational interest in dealing with tort
cases has not been generally recognized. It has been in large measure
ignored. .... "26 But worse was to come. When, at last, some scholars
purported to take up the relational baton in the field of torts, they were
266
So what claimed to be
advocates of corrective justice theory.
it focused on the
Instead,
but.
anything
was
"relational" tort theory
discrete relationship between "sufferer and doer" and excluded all
others. 267 In this, ironically, it mirrored the traditional scholarship on
contract law from which relational contract law scholars had been so
keen to move away. So when self-proclaimed relational torts theory did
appear, it was the very antithesis of what Green had advocated for
decades earlier. It is past time to get relational tort law theory on the
same-multi-relational-track that relational contract theory has been
on for decades.
Such a theory must not only explain past cases, but also provide
practical guidance for the future. The objective is to provide judges,
litigants, entrepreneurs, corporations, and attorneys with a tool that
2 68
replaces the current "inconsistent, unfocused, and often nonsensical"
state of duty law with something clear that is easily applied. This also
means that the theory should provide clear criteria against which it is
possible to ascertain whether a case has been correctly decided, and so
give appellate judges a meaningful basis on which to supervise the trial
courts within their jurisdiction.

264.

Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the RelationalApproach,

1 ANN.

SURv.

AM. L. 139, 156 (1988) (discussing Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentiation,60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974)).
265.

Green, supra note 13, at 460.

266. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv., 403, 403-21 (1992);
Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811,

1820-21 (2004).
267. WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 186.
268. See Cardi, supra note 20, at 1875.
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A.

Formation Phase

As we have already established, the role of duty of care in
negligence is analogous to that of privity in contracts. 269 Its purpose is to
identify and delimit the number of parties who may sue or be sued. 270
Because of the high stakes involved if the answer to this question is too
unpredictable, Part II also established that duty must be a question of
law for the court. 271
But duty of care in negligence is not just analogous to privity in
contracts; Cardozo actually modeled duty on privity. 272 Thus we saw in
Part III that Cardozo's method of determining whether a duty exists
turns on (a) whether the parties had a relevant relationship with each
other at the time of the defendant's conduct; 273 and (b) whether that
relationship was qualitatively different from any relationship that the
defendant might have had with the general public. 274
As to the first point, Cardozo took the view that the essential
quality of privity of contract that should be adopted by duty of care in
negligence is the ability of each party to be able to identify the other
parties to the relationship. 27 In each of Moch, Glanzer, Palsgraf; and
Ultramares, the plaintiff would clearly have been able to identify the
defendant. So Cardozo held in each case that the existence (or lack
thereof) of a relevant relationship centered on the question of whether
the defendant was in a position to be able to identify the plaintiff at the
time of the alleged tort. In one respect, however, these holdings tend to
obscure a fundamental aspect of identity-based relational theory.
Whether the plaintiff could have identified the defendant is actually
irrelevant.
Because they address different aspects of human behavior, the laws
of contracts and torts were not designed with precisely matching
characteristics. In particular, as I have explained elsewhere, the law of
contracts has two phases, whereas the law of torts only has one. 276 Each
269.

See supra Part II.

270.

See supra Part III.

271. See supra Part II.
272. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174
N.E. 441, 444-46 (N.Y. 1931).
273. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
274. Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276; H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897
(N.Y. 1928).
275. Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 446.
276. Kaye, supra note 260, at 293-94.
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has a performance phase, during which the tort or breach of contract
occurs. But it is only contract law that boasts a preceding "formation
phase," during which the terms of the contract are established (whether
by means of offer, acceptance, and consideration, or promissory
estoppel). 277 It is during the formation phase that privity of contract is,
therefore, established.
The law of torts, by contrast, has no equivalent to the contractual
formation phase. This makes torts inherently asymmetrical. Except in
cases of comparative fault (where, in all but five United States
jurisdictions, 278 fault is apportioned among the actors in proportion to
2 79
only the defendant has the
their respective degrees of culpability),
information necessary for full decision-making autonomy about the
relationship. 280 Only tortfeasors-whether direct or vicarious-have the
opportunity to consider the risks that their conduct might bring about.
Potential victims typically have no idea of their perilous position at the
hands of the defendant, and so do not have the same capacity to evaluate
their options.
Two consequences follow from this asymmetry. First, in the
absence of a formation phase, the determination of whether or not a duty
exists for the purposes of the tort of negligence can be made only at the
moment of performance (that is, the commission of the tort). Second,
because such performance refers to the conduct of the defendant, the
defendant must have been able to identify the plaintiff at the time of the
tort. But the converse need not be true. Because plaintiffs do not have
full decision-making autonomy about the commission of the tort, they do
not need to have been able to identify the defendant in order to be owed
a duty of care for the purposes of the law of negligence.
B.

Third Party Contracts

In the absence of a formation phase within the law of negligence,
Cardozo effectively co-opted the formation phase of the law of contracts
28
as a sort of formation phase for the law of negligence, too. ' Glanzer v.
Shepard is a clear example of this approach in action. The contract
between Bech, the seller of beans, and Shepard, a public weigher of
277. Id.
278. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
279. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1235 (Cal. 1975).
280. It might be argued that assumption of risk is another instance where the plaintiff retains
autonomy of decision-making. But assumption of risk is not a true affirmative defense; it would be
irrational to assume a risk of someone else's negligence. Indeed, it is really just a synonym for a
claim of "no duty" or "no breach" and, in practice, is typically pled as such.
281. Kaye, supra note 260, at 296-99.
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beans, required that Shepard send to the buyer, Glanzer, certified copies
of the weight sheets for the beans weighed. 282 Glanzer was not privy to
the contract between Shepard and Bech. 283 Nor was it a true third-party
beneficiary of the contract, because it received neither money nor free
beans or services from the contract; the weight sheets were simply proof
of the basis on which payment was calculated. So it could not seek a
remedy within the law of contracts. However, the contractual formation
phase involving Bech and Shepard also generated a relationship between
Shepard and Glanzer because it informed Shepard of the buyer's
identity. 284 Although this was not a relationship that the law would
typically consider to be contractual (because Glanzer proffered no
consideration), it meant that Shepard was aware of who (in addition to
Bech) would be relying on its expertise in weighing beans.
In H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., by contrast, the city's
contract with Rensselaer Water did not specify the identity of those to
whom Rensselaer was expected to supply water. 285 Instead, it simply
imposed an obligation to supply the public generally. 286 It might still be
said that there was some sort of relationship between Rensselaer and
Moch, but it was no different from the relationship that Rensselaer had
with any other city inhabitant. 287 There was nothing in the formation
phase of the contract between Rensselaer and the city that could be said
to have generated a relationship between Rensselaer and Moch that
might have marked it out as "special": that is, qualitatively different
from any relationship with the general public. 288 That would have
required that the contract between Rensselaer and the city identify Moch
expressly as an entity that would be reliant on Rensselaer. Without such
identification, there could be no special relationship between Rensselaer
and Moch. And, without such a relationship, it could not be said that
Rensselaer owed Moch a duty of care for the purposes of the law of
negligence.
Moch demonstrates that the options available to a court as a matter
of first impression in such a case would appear to be either (a) to
recognize a duty owed to every city inhabitant, or (b) to deny that a duty
is owed to anyone without such a special relationship. But the law
cannot choose option (a) because that would risk the defendant's being

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275 (N.Y. 1922).
See id. at 275-76.
See id.
159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928).
See id. at 898.
See id. at 896-97.
See id. at 896-98.
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held liable to an indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs. In reality,
therefore, there is no choice. The law has to choose option (b).
289
provides an even
The later case of Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.
clearer illustration of this point.290 On the evening of July 13, 1977,
millions of customers receiving electricity from Consolidated Edison
291
Company of New York, Inc. ("Con Edison") suffered a power outage.
The next day, Julius Strauss, a tenant in an apartment building, found
himself without running water because the building's pumps had no
electricity. 292 He decided to descend the stairs in the dark in order to
293
obtain some water but fell and sustained serious injuries. He sought
compensation from Con Edison on the grounds that the contract between
the building's owners and Con Edison meant that Con Edison owed him
294
The New York Court of
a duty of care as a resident in the building.
2
As in Moch, there was no way for the
Appeals did not agree.
defendant to be able to identify the plaintiff as a potential victim. It was
Strauss's landlord who had the contract with Con Edison; from the
latter's point of view, he was (like an indeterminate number of other
people) just an unidentifiable tenant who happened to reside in New
296
York. Con Edison therefore owed him no duty of care.
2 97
however, involved an
The case of J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
relational
identity-based
identifiable tenant, and so-as Cardozian,
298
J'Aire
theory would predict-the outcome was inevitably different.
operated a restaurant at an airport on premises leased from the County of
Sonoma. 299 The County subsequently contracted with Gregory to
renovate the HVAC system and install insulation on the premises, but
300
the work was not completed within a reasonable period of time. J'Aire
claimed compensation for lost profits from Gregory on the grounds of
the latter's negligence. 301 While J'Aire could not be said to have been a
third-party beneficiary of the contract between Gregory and the County,
it was obvious that J'Aire would be affected by any delay in its
completion because Gregory's employees were actually working on the
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

469 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1983).
Id. at 949-51.
Id. at 949.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. at 950.
598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
See id. at 62-63.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
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very premises that J'Aire operated. 02 J'Aire
identifiable and thus owed a duty of care. 30 3
C.

983

was,

accordingly,

Occam's Razor

J'Aire is an especially interesting case for our purposes because it
highlights two other features that this Article has not yet addressed.
First, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of California, which
decided J'Aire, did not use the relational theory promoted here to do so.
Instead, it listed six factors, including foreseeability, that had to be taken
into account in order to decide the duty question. 304 That, of course,
makes unpredictability endemic: the more factors to be considered in a
decision, the more likely it is that judges will disagree, and the harder it
becomes for attorneys to advise their clients on the likely outcome of
prospective litigation. This makes assessing legal risk before the event
exceptionally difficult.
What is being argued here, therefore, is that Cardozo-inspired,
identity-based relational theory-which, as we saw in Part IV, has no
room for foreseeability as part of the test for duty of care in
negligence-provides a much clearer, simpler, and more predictable
method of explaining the outcomes of such cases.305 This, in turn, has
the potential to significantly reduce the amount of litigation in cases of
alleged negligence. If identity-based relational theory had been
employed in the J'Aire litigation itself, the case would probably never
have reached the courts at all; it certainly would not have made it all the
way to the California Supreme Court.
In other words, Cardozo-inspired relational theory takes Occam's
Razor to the analysis of duty of care in negligence. It cuts out all the
unnecessary, confusing, and unpredictable elements. Yet, while finding
the reasons given in many past cases to be inaccurate or somewhat
off-point, it often confirms that the outcomes in those cases-at least at
appellate level-have been correct.
D.

TruncatedFormationPhase

The second feature that J'Aire illustrates is what might be called the
truncated formation phase of some contracts, and how that comes to be
of significance for duty of care in negligence. While complex executory
contracts (or executory contracts of high value) typically involve a
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 65.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 63 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)).

305.

See supra PartIV.
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protracted period of negotiation, many everyday immediately-executed
contracts of lesser value involve virtually no negotiation at all. Buying a
coffee at a coffee shop is a classic example: the store advertises what it
has (or can make), and the customer simply orders and pays.
Such simple, discrete contracts do still have a formation phase
(where the beverage is selected and paid for) which occurs before the
performance phase, in which the coffee is made and handed over. But,
unless payment is made by credit card, few details about the customer
are ever known to the coffee shop.
Yet we would hardly say that the identity of the customer who pays
by cash is unknown to the barista. The latter can normally still, for
example, identify the customer when the coffee is ready. It is just that
identity is determined in a different way from the type of situations
envisioned in Glanzer, Moch, Strauss, or Ultramares.Acting on behalf
of their employers, baristas obviously sell coffee to someone. So far as
the law is concerned, therefore, they form a contract with the person in
front of them. In such cases, identity is determined by the customer's
physical attributes rather than by the customer's name. Indeed, while
baristas often write a name on a cup of coffee to indicate for whom it has
been prepared, this is so often misspelled that some customers resort to
providing a simple "Starbucks name" instead-an alias that is easy for a
barista to spell. 306
All of that is trite contract law. One of the interesting features about
J'Aire is that it effectively adopted an analogous approach to identity for
the purposes of duty of care in negligence law. J'Aire was identifiable
by Gregory not because the latter was expressly told that J'Aire operated
the restaurant where Gregory was supposed to be working, but because
Gregory knew that the restaurant would inevitably be affected if the
renovations were not completed expeditiously-and that the restaurant
was clearly being operated by someone.307 So, despite the apparent lack
of knowledge of certain attributes of identity of the restaurant operator
(such as name), the restaurant's physical presence was enough to
establish a duty.
and
contractor
between
relationship
the
Moreover,
concession-holder in J'Aire was "special"-just like that between barista
and customer-in that it was qualitatively different from any
relationship that the contractor might have had with the general public
306. See Svati Kirsten Narula, What's Your Starbucks Name?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2014),
283
163.
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/whats-your-starbucks-name/
307. J'Aire Corp., 598 P.2d at 62-63, 66 (stating that "liability for negligent conduct may only
be imposed where there is a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff or to a class of which
the plaintiff is a member").
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(such as travelers using the airport). The contractor was making specific
improvements to the premises of a specific person, just as a barista
prepares a specific beverage for a specific person rather than the same
infusion for everyone.
It should also be noted that this approach is entirely consistent with
the role of duty outlined in Part II.308 As we saw there, and as Cardozo
memorably explained in Ultramares,the purpose of duty is to avoid the
prospect of potential liability to an "indeterminate class" of victims.3 09 If
physical presence is used as the basis for determining identity within a
special relationship, such a prospect is unlikely to pose much of a
problem. Just as there is an intrinsic limit to the number of individuals
who buy each cup of coffee, there is an intrinsic limit to the number who
own a single airport restaurant concession.
The plaintiff Strauss in Strauss was not, of course, in such a
situation. In fact, his position was different in two ways. First, Con
Edison was not supplying electricity only to Strauss's landlord; on the
contrary, it had millions of customers throughout New York. 310 While
there might be an intrinsic limit to the number of tenants in an apartment
building, there is no intrinsic limit to the number of people in a state.
Second, Strauss did not have a "special" relationship with Con Edison:
there was nothing qualitatively different about it to distinguish it from
relationships that Con Edison had with anyone else who consumed its
electricity.3
On the other hand, the physical presence method of determining
identity does explain why Cardozo was prepared to find the existence of
a duty in Macpherson, even though the names of those who could be
sitting in the defective car were unknowable to Buick. Macpherson's
very presence in a designated seat was enough.312 It also explains the
outcome in Palsgraf While the guards pushed and pulled the
package-carrying passenger onto the moving train, they (and their
employer, the Railroad) would have owed a duty to those by the
platform edge in the direction of travel. 313 The fact that the guards would
not have known the names of those individuals would have been
irrelevant; their very presence would have sufficed to make them

308. See supra PartII.
309. See supra Part II; J'Aire Corp., 598 P.2d at 63-64, 66; Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
310. See Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 469 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (App. Div. 1983).
311. See id. at 949-50.
312. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
313. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,99 (N.Y. 1928).
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314
identifiable. But Mrs. Palsgraf was "at the other end of the platform."
She was, therefore, not present at the scene and was accordingly owed
no duty of care.
As this shows, the physical presence approach yields much the
same results as use of the familiar metaphor of the "zone of danger"
often wrongly attributed to Cardozo-in fact, "the danger zone" was a
phrase uttered by Judge Andrews. 315 Physical presence is essentially
presence in that zone.

E.

Physical Versus Economic Loss

As already noted, both Macpherson and Ultramares involved
groups of plaintiffs who were delimited in number, but whose names
were nevertheless unknown. 316 Cardozo was prepared to recognize a
duty owed to a group of three such individuals in Macpherson, but he
was not prepared to recognize a duty owed to thirty-two such individuals
in Ultramares.
One explanation for the different treatment, already provided, is
that duty of care is modeled on privity in contracts and that whereas four
parties to a contract is quite typical, thirty-three is not. The trouble with
that explanation, however, is that it is not particularly helpful as a
criterion for future decisions. It suggests that there must be a cut-off
point beyond which the number of potential plaintiffs is too high for the
law to recognize them as being owed a duty of care, but it leaves open
the precise number at which that point is reached. Whatever number is
chosen, moreover, will necessarily be arbitrary.
The physical presence method of establishing a party's identity
surely furnishes a much better explanation. While the plaintiff in
Macpherson was clearly physically present in the vehicle at the time of
the accident, there is nothing about an audit that requires the physical
presence of anyone who relies on it. Transactions like audits are not
carried out on the basis of a truncated formation period. They rely on a
more thoughtful negotiation of details, such as price, timing, and the
seniority and experience of those designated to carry out the work.
This should not, however, be taken as saying that identity-based
relational theory means that auditors can never owe a duty of care to
someone with whom they have no privity of contract. On the contrary,
what it means is that the plaintiff's identity must have been established
314. See Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 445; Strauss, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 954; MacPherson,
N.E. at 1053 (N.Y. 1916); Palsgraf; 162 N.E. at 99, 1010.
315. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99; see also id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
316. See supra Part III.D-E.
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during a more protracted formation period during which the name of the
potential victim(s) will have become known or knowable to the
defendant.
The case of White v. Guarente31 7 illustrates this point. 3 18 As the
New York Court of Appeals decided, just over forty years after
Ultramares, where an accountant is retained to "perform an audit and
prepare the tax returns of Associates, known to be a limited partnership,"
the accountant also assumes a duty "for the benefit of those in th[at]
fixed, definable and contemplated group." 319 The Court correctly
distinguished Ultramareson the grounds that the latter case involved an
"indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might
deal . . . in reliance on the audit," so that its significance "is its holding
that an accountant need not respond in negligence to those in the
extensive and indeterminable investing public-at-large." 32 0 In White
itself, by contrast:

'

[T]he services of the accountant were not extended to a faceless or
unresolved class of persons, but rather to a known group possessed of
vested rights, marked by a definable limit .... The instant situation did
not involve prospective limited partners, unknown at the time and who
might be induced to join, but rather actual limited partners, fixed and
32
determined.

The Texas case of McCamish v. F.E. Appling 22 provides another
example of how duty in the law of negligence may be established
through a highly negotiated transaction. 32 3 Appling was the managing
partner of Boca Chica, a joint venture formed to develop recreational
property. 324 Boca Chica obtained a loan and line of credit from Victoria
Savings Association ("VSA") in 1985 to finance a real estate project on
the basis of an oral representation from VSA that it would later expand
the line of credit, provided that Boca Chica's lot sales justified
completing the development.32 5 Despite the continued viability of the
project, however, VSA subsequently decided not to extend the additional
credit. 326 Boca Chica went bankrupt.2 7 It sought to bring a lender
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

372 N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977).
Id. at 318-19; see UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 449-50; MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.
White, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19.
Id. at 318.
Id.
991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 788.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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liability claim against VSA but was concerned that if VSA were placed
in receivership under the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC"), then such a claim would be unenforceable because it was
328
Instead, it agreed to a settlement with
based on an oral representation.
VSA, but only after Appling insisted that VSA's lawyers sign the
settlement to say that it met the terms of the relevant statute to make it
329
McCamish, Martin duly did so as
enforceable against the FSLIC.
did not meet the statutory
settlement
the
But
attorneys.
VSA's
the FSLIC. 330
against
requirements and so was not enforceable
The identity-based relational theory that is being developed in this
Article makes it clear that McCamish, Martin owed a duty to Appling,
even though there was no attorney-client relationship between them.
Appling's identity was not only well known to McCamish, Martin; the
fact that one of the latter's attorneys signed the settlement agreement
was due precisely to Appling's insistence upon it as a condition of
agreeing to the settlement. The relationship between them had thus come
about after a period of intense negotiation, whereas nothing equivalent
33
had taken place in Ultramares. 1
This highlights the fact that the truncated method of establishing
identity by mere physical presence is available only in cases where the
defendant's alleged negligence causes physical harm (whether to person
or to property). It is not available as a method of establishing duty when
332
In
the defendant's alleged negligence causes purely economic loss.
a
in
was
defendant
the
if
only
established
be
such cases, a duty will
reason
The
name.
position, at the time of the act, to know the plaintiff's
for the distinction in treatment of physical harm compared to purely
economic loss is simply that the sustaining of physical harm is typically
limited to a much smaller group of victims than purely economic loss.
The specter of potential liability to an indeterminate class is, therefore,
much more likely to manifest itself in cases of purely economic loss, and
so the law adopts a more restrictive test of duty in order to cope.
The West Virginia case of Aikens v. Debow provides an excellent
example of this principle in action.333 The plaintiff, Richard Aikens,
operated a motel and restaurant known as the Martinsburg Econo-Lodge,
which was most easily accessed via a bridge that passed over Interstate
81 ("I-81").334 The defendant, Robert Debow, was driving a flatbed truck
328. See id. at 789.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 790.
331. Compare id. at 791, with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 442-43 (N.Y. 1931).
332. See Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E. 2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000).
333. Id.
334. See id. at 579.
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north on I-81, carrying a trackhoe that was too high to pass under the
overpass, and so caused an accident which did substantial damage to the
bridge.3 " It was closed for nineteen days to make the necessary repairs.
There can be no doubt that Debow owed a duty to the owner of the
bridge.3 3 6 Because the harm sustained was physical, and the cause of that
harm was a negligent act, mere physical presence of the plaintiff
(analogous to what is acceptable for the purposes of the truncated
formation phase in contracts) is enough to establish duty.337 The bridge
could hardly have been more physically present, and it must obviously
have been owned by someone, so that person was clearly owed a duty of
care.
But Aikens suffered no physical harm.338 In order to be able to
establish a duty of care, therefore, he needed to show that, at the time of
the accident, Debow was in a position to be able to identify Aikens as a
potential victim of his own negligent driving. But that was clearly not
the case. Aikens's claim-seeking compensation for the decreased
revenues he experienced due to closure of the overpass-was therefore
denied on the grounds that he was not owed a duty of care.339
The point is that it would be extremely unlikely for a motorist or
truck driver to cause physical damage to more than one bridge in any
given incident, and so the more relaxed method of establishing identity
through physical presence is acceptable as a means of establishing duty.
But the number of businesses, who might suffer a loss of profits as their
businesses receive less passing trade as a result of damage to a bridge, is
clearly indeterminate. Indeed, hotels are often grouped together in
specific locations, so that it might well be said to be entirely foreseeable
that other hotels would have suffered in similar fashion to Aikens's
Econo-Lodge. And, where there are hotels, it is also foreseeable that
there will be restaurants, who are likely also to have been affected.
Maybe gas stations too, and places selling coffee, etc. Yet, despite such
foreseeability, the law refuses to recognize a duty owed in such cases.
That is because duty is, as has already been established, not a matter of
foreseeability at all.3 4 0 In cases of purely economic loss, proof of duty
depends on the plaintiff managing to establish that their identity was
known (or was capable of being known) by the defendant at the time of
the latter's tort.3 41
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See id.
See id. at 586.
Id. at 583-85, 589.
See id.
Id. at 580-82, 589-90.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 582-85, 589-90.
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Third-PartyRelationships

Cardozo could, of course, decide only those cases that came before
him. While Moch, Glanzer, and Ultramareswere all cases in which the
defendant was in privity of contract with a third party, there seems little
reason to believe that Cardozo would have insisted that any relevant
relationship with a third party had to be contractual before it could be
considered as the potential source of a duty of care in negligence. On the
contrary, there is every reason to think that a status-based relationship
34 2
with a third party could also be a potential source of a duty of care.
3
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California14 is a good
3
example. " Prosenjit Poddar was a voluntary outpatient of Dr. Lawrence
Moore, a psychologist employed by the Cowell Memorial Hospital at the
34
During therapy, "Poddar
University of California at Berkeley.
informed Moore . .. that he was going to kill an unnamed girl, readily
identifiable as Tatiana [TarasoffJ, when she returned home from
346
He subsequently carried out that
spending the summer in Brazil."
murder. Tatiana's parents sued Moore and the University for negligently
failing to warn Tatiana of the risk to her safety, and the Supreme Court
of California held that both defendants had owed Tatiana a duty of
7

care. 34
As the Court found that Tatiana was "readily identifiable,"
Cardozian relational theory would dictate that the defendants would
have owed her a duty of care if Poddar, Moore, and the University had
been in a contractual relationship. It is difficult to believe, however, that
Cardozo would have advocated for the contrary conclusion if there had
been no such contract. The fact that Poddar was Moore's patient clearly
established a relationship of significance. The substance of that
relationship was not dependent on whether payment was made for
34 8
Moore's services.
49
The Ohio case of Mussivand v. David takes the significance of
350
For these relationships
status-based relationships one step further.
need never be the sort that might sometimes have a commercial basis,
and yet they may still provide the basis for establishing a duty of care in
342.
941-43,
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941,
945, 951-54 (1971).
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
See id. at 340, 342-33.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 339, 341.
Id. at 340-46, 348.
Id. at 342-44.
544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989).
See id. at 269-73.
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negligence. 3 5 ' In Mussivand the defendant had an affair with the
plaintiff's wife, but failed to inform her that he had a
sexually-transmitted infection ("STI"). She then passed the STI onto her
husband, who sued the defendant.3 2 The Supreme Court of Ohio
confirmed the current, chaotic state of the doctrine of duty by opining
that: "There is no formula for ascertaining whether a duty exists,""3 and
that "[a]ny number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty
in particular circumstances.""4 Thus a case that should never have even
made it to trial found its way to the state Supreme Court.
Identity-based relational theory makes the determination of whether
or not a duty exists so much simpler. Because the defendant knew that
his lover was married, and because the law permits a person to have only
one spouse, the defendant knew the identity of his lover's husband. The
husband was therefore clearly owed a duty of care. As the Court made
clear, however, the defendant would not have owed such a duty to
anyone else with whom his lover might have been sleeping." 5 This is
because (unless his lover had expressly told him who they were) he
would have had no way of identifying those other men. Nor, for that
matter, would he have owed a duty to the husband if he had had no
reason to believe that his lover was married.
It might be objected that this analysis fails to address a situation
where the married couple do not share a last name. But that is highly
analogous to the case of the Starbucks customer who either uses an alias
"Starbucks name" or whose name is butchered by a barista writing it on
a cup. So far as the doctrine of duty is concerned, the issue is not
whether the name used is legally accurate. On the contrary, the relevant
question is to whom the name refers. 356 Thus, whether they like it or not,
some people are regularly known as "so-and-so's husband/wife/spouse."
Since he married Senator Kamala Harris, for example, Douglas Emhoff
has no doubt often been referred to as "Mr. Kamala Harris." Indeed, it
seems likely that many people who know that Senator (now Vice
President) Harris is married are unaware of her husband's official name.
So far as the doctrine of duty of care in negligence is concerned, that
lack of detail is immaterial: "Mr. Kamala Harris" is as much Douglas
Emhoff's name as Douglas Emhoff.

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.
Id. at 268, 272.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id.
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RelationshipsBetween Plaintiffand Defendant

Relationships between the defendant and a third party are not the
only kinds of relationships capable of generating a duty of care for the
purposes of the law of negligence. On the contrary, relationships
between defendant and plaintiff themselves are surely even better placed
to create such duties, because what is then entailed is simply that the
formation phase in a contractual relationship between the parties leads to
35 7
a performance phase in the law of torts.
A contract between a patient and a physician provides a classic
example. For it is hard to see how the physician could ever be in breach
of it. Failure to act with appropriate professional care and skill will not
amount to a breach of contract, but to professional malpractice or
negligence in torts. So while the relationship utilizes the formation
formalities of a contract, any breach takes us into the realm of the tort of
negligence. Much the same is true of the relationship between a client
and an attorney. Indeed, if the client is seeking to bring an action for
personal injury and the attorney is working on a contingency fee
arrangement, then this truly is a contract which can never be breached.
Any failure by the attorney to uphold the terms of the contract will again
be classed not as a breach of contract, but as malpractice implicating the
35 8
tort of negligence.
In such circumstances, it would be bizarre to deny the existence of
a duty for the purposes of the law of negligence. The relationship
between the parties is clearly "special," in the sense that it is
qualitatively different from any relationship the defendant has with the
public at large, and there is no chance of the defendant being liable to an
"indeterminate class." Moreover, any failure to recognize such a duty
would leave the plaintiff entirely without a remedy because, as we have
already noted, they would be unable to sustain a claim for breach of
contract.
Identity-based relational theory recognizes a duty being owed by a
professional person to a patient or client because it is self-evident that
the identity of the latter is known to the former at the relevant time. And,
359
as cases like Beul v. ASSE Intern., Inc. demonstrate, such relationships
3
need not amount to contracts to be the source of such duties. 60 In Beul, a
16-year-old German girl by the name of Kristin, who wanted to spend a
year in the United States, was placed with the Bruce family of Fort

357.
358.
359.
360.

Kaye, supra note 260, at 293.
Id. at 296-97.
233 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 445.
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Atkinson, Wisconsin, by an agency that operated student exchange
programs. 361 Under federal regulations, the agency was under an
obligation to "monitor the progress and welfare of the exchange visit" 362
while, according to the rules of the trade association of which it was a
member, the agency was required to "maintain thorough, accurate, and
continual communication with host families and school authorities." 363
The Seventh Circuit held that this meant that "the agency .. . was
standing in for [Kristin's] parents." 3 4 Effectively, it was in loco
parentis, a status-based relationship if ever there was one, and certainly
not a relationship that exists only when a commercial contract has been
agreed. 365
Over a period of more than six months, Mr. Bruce developed an
unhealthy obsession with Kristin.3 66 He repeatedly raped her. 3 67 During
this period, the agency representative made little or no attempt to contact
Kristin or the Bruce family, and the alarm was raised only when Mrs.
Bruce discovered love letters. 368 After his abuse was discovered, Mr.
Bruce killed himself.369 Kristin was left severely traumatized. The
Seventh Circuit was in no doubt that the agency owed Kristen a duty of
care in negligence. 370 The relationship that it had with her in loco
parentis was clearly enough to generate such a duty, and it obviously
knew Kristin's name since it had placed her with the Bruce family in the
first place.
H. Public Relationships
So far as the potential generation of a duty of care in negligence is
concerned, identity-based rational theory holds that relationships
between organs of government and members of the public work in much
the same way as relationships of the types already considered. 37 1 So if
there is nothing to mark the relationship out as "special"-different from
the relationship between the government body and the public at largethen it will not be capable of generating a duty of care. 372 What makes a
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id. at 444.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
See id. at 445-46.
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.

371.

See infra notes 373-91 and accompanying text.

372. See infra notes 373-91 and accompanying text.
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relationship special is where the government had the ability, at the time
of the accident, to know the victim's identity.
373
The case of Solomon v. City of New York followed precisely this
reasoning.3 7 4 The city had numerous park and playground facilities, and
had promulgated regulations which prohibited bicycle riding within
designated areas. 375 Solomon was injured within one such area and
sought compensation from the city for failing to enforce the
regulations. 376 As a unanimous New York Court of Appeals found,
however, there was no "special" relationship between the city and the
plaintiff.3 77 There was nothing specifically to identify Solomon as
3 78
someone to whose care the city should pay particular attention.
Solomon was simply a member of the general public and thus in the
379
same position as everyone else. Accordingly, no duty of care had been
38 0
established, and the lawsuit had been properly dismissed.
38
The Florida case of Kaisner v. Kolb, 1 on the other hand, provides
an example of how such a duty may arise.32 Kaisner and his family
were traveling in a pickup truck when they were stopped for an expired
inspection sticker. 383 Mr. Kaisner left the pickup truck and walked
4
towards the police cruiser. 38 One of the officers approached Kaisner and
38
told him not to come any closer. ' Then the officer returned to the
38 6
Some minutes passed when the police cruiser was hit from
cruiser.
behind by another vehicle, and was propelled forward, striking
Kaisner. 387 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the police had owed
388
him a duty of care.
Clearly, the officers' relationship with Kaisner at the time of the
accident was very different from any relationship that they had with
3 89
other members of the public. It was also a relevant relationship for the

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

489 N.E.2d 1294 (N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
543 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733-34.
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purposes of duty because it limited his freedom of movement. 390 He was
also right there in the officers' presence. 391 As we saw earlier, that is
sufficient to establish identity when the victim has suffered physical
injury 3 92
An Iowa case further underlines the identity-based approach, but
also perhaps suggests that Cardozo's own application of it in Palsgraf
might not have been entirely accurate. In Raas v. State,393 the court held
that the state owed a duty to an individual who was attacked in the
parking lot by two inmates escaping from a correctional facility. 394
However, the state did not owe a duty to another individual who was
attacked while fishing on a river. 395 The former was clearly in the
defendants' presence because he was on their premises; the latter was
not.
This approach makes it simple to tell when a plaintiff is in the
defendant's presence, and thus eliminates the need for a highly
fact-specific inquiry, so it is particularly appropriate as the basis for
deciding a question of law, like duty. It is also consistent with traditional
notions of premises liability; the physical boundaries of the premises
become the boundaries for the purposes of duty. 396 But it also clearly
suggests that Cardozo should have held that Mrs. Palsgraf was owed a
duty of care.
It is, of course, true that a railroad station is rather different from a
parking lot, because the former is a highly segmented space divided by
tracks on which passengers are forbidden to step foot. But Mrs. Palsgraf
was not just on the Railroad's premises; she was on the very same
platform as the one where the hurrying passenger dropped his
package. 397 It seems unlikely that a court in 2021, which found itself
facing facts similar to those in Palsgraf, would deny that the modern
Mrs. Palsgraf would have been owed a duty of care. It might be, in other
words, that Cardozo was right about the significance of identity-based
relational theory, but that he was wrong about how to apply it in
Palsgrafitself.

390. Id.
391. Id.
392. It seems likely that, after conducting various checks during the stop, the officers would
have discovered Kaisner's name by the time of the impact. But, because he suffered physical injury,
that was not necessary for the purposes of establishing a duty of care.

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

729 N.W.2d 444, 446, 449-50 (Iowa 2007).
Id. at 446, 449-50.
Id. at 450.
See supra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
Palsgraf v. Long Island RR Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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Omissions

Like non-contractual relationships, omissions are another type of
case that Cardozo did not get to address. The issue at stake in such cases
is whether and when a defendant owes a duty of care to the victim for
the purposes of the law of negligence, even though the defendant neither
performed an act nor uttered a statement. 398 But it turns out that, as the
California case of People v. Heitzman illustrates, identity-based
relational theory is so straightforward and versatile that it can be applied
399
to omissions in much the same way as to acts and statements.
Heitzman revolved around the death of 76-year-old Robert
Heitzman, who was both paralyzed down the left side of his body and
doubly incontinent.4"G His death was caused by septic shock due to sores
caused by malnutrition, dehydration, and neglect.4 0 l He had been living
in the home of his adult son, Richard Sr., together with another son,
402
His
Jerry (who was the primary caregiver), and Richard's three sons.
adult daughter, Susan, had lived there too until a year before Robert's
40 3
She had
death, and had continued to visit the house on a regular basis.
she had
and
filthy,
become
had
house
the
out,
moving
since
noticed that,
encouraged Jerry to talk to a social worker and take their father to see a
doctor.4 4
Jerry and Richard Sr. were charged with involuntary manslaughter,
and with willfully causing their father to suffer the infliction of
5
unjustifiable pain and mental suffering;40 Susan was charged with
406
As the California Supreme Court
willfully permitting that suffering.
noted, "It was thus her failure to act, i.e., her failure to prevent the
infliction of abuse on her father, that created the potential for her
criminal liability under the statute." 407 This meant that "she must first be
8
under an existing legal duty to take positive action."
Writing on behalf of the majority, and in language reminiscent of
that employed by Cardozo in both Palsgraf and Ultramares, Chief
Justice Lucas rejected the prosecution's contention that the Penal Code
398.
399.
this case
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

See People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Cal. 1994).
See id. at 1245. I am grateful to my colleague, Professor Rebecca Morgan, for bringing
to my attention.
See id. at 1231-32.
Id. at 1232.
See id. at 1231-32.
See id. at 1232.
Id.
Id. Such charges were contrary to Section 368(a) of the California Penal Code.
Id.
Id. at 1233 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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imposed a blanket duty on everyone to prevent the abuse of any elder.4 09
That would be to cast too "wide [a] net."" In other words, Heitzman
raised a question that is, in many ways, the mirror-image of that at stake
in Palsgrafand Ultramares. In the latter two cases, the question was
whether there was an indeterminate class of plaintiffs. In Heitzman, the
question was whether there was an indeterminate class of defendants.
Because the statute under which the charge against Susan was
brought did not itself specify when such a duty would arise, "liability for
[her] failure to act must be premised on the existence of a duty found
elsewhere."" The court fell back on the common law of negligence
which, as Lucas correctly noted, meant that the existence of a duty
depended on establishing "some legal or special relationship." 4 12
As we have already seen, such relationships may take more than
one form. 413 One of relevance in Heitzman was that between defendant
and victim. That suggested two possibilities: one with a statutory source,
and one derived from common law. The statutory possibility would have
meant "equat[ing] the statutory duty of financial support with the duty to
prevent physical harm triggering felony criminal liability," 414 for which
Lucas could "discern no reasonable basis." 41" As for the common law,
while "parents have long had a duty to care for and protect their minor,
there is no corresponding common law obligation on adult children to
protect and care for their aging parents." 416
The other potentially relevant relationship involved that between
the defendant and a third party. That would have meant a "relationship
between the defendant and the person inflicting pain or suffering on the
elder . .. such that the defendant [was] under [a] duty to supervise and
control that individual's conduct." 417 Lucas himself observed that such a
"class of potential offenders may indeed be relatively small," 418 and so
would avoid the indeterminacy problem.
Because Susan's relationship with her brothers was nothing other
than a regular sibling relationship-which certainly does not imply an
obligation on one to control another-she could not be said to have been
409. Id. at 1235.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1234.
412. Id. at 1236.
413. See supra Part v (describing various types of relationships, such as third-party
relationships, relationships between plaintiffs and defendants, public relationships, and relationships
based on omissions).
414. Heitzman, 886 P.2d at 1243.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1243.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1244.
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under a legal duty to control the conduct of either of her brothers.
419
Accordingly, the charges against her were dismissed, though whether
Heitzman was decided correctly according to California criminal law is
not relevant for current purposes. 420 The point is that the analysis of duty
in cases of allegedly negligent omissions was clearly correct.
J.

Relationshipsat One Remove

1. Vicarious Liability
We have now seen how identity-based relational theory can easily
determine whether a defendant owed a duty of care to a victim in cases
caused by acts, statements, and omissions, irrespective of whether they
lead to physical or purely economic loss. In each case, the approach
requires proof that the defendant was in a position to know the victim's
identity.421 In all such cases, this will be established where the defendant
was in a relevant relationship that made it possible to know the victim's
name at the time of the tort. 4 2 2 In cases of physical harm, identity will
also be established if the victim had been in the defendant's presence at
the time of the tort.4 23
Eagle-eyed readers will, moreover, have noted that the various
methods of establishing identity mirror the forms of relational contracts
listed in Part IV. 424 In other words, identity-based relational negligence
theory turns out to be remarkably analogous to relational contract theory.
We have still to see, however, how it addresses the issue of vicarious
liability. Yet cases like Glanzer, Macpherson, Ultramares, and even
Palsgraf involved suits against a defendant who was allegedly
vicariously liable for the acts of someone else.
But there is nothing surprising here. Vicarious liability always
arises out of a special relationship between the direct tortfeasor and the
vicarious party.4 25 Typically this is an employer-employee relationship
419. Id. at 1245.
420. See id. This was the decision of a bare majority of 4-3. As Justice Baxter pointed out in
his powerful dissent, it is by no means clear that the emphasis on the number of people likely to be
affected by the statute is a relevant consideration in criminal law, for "most criminal statutes apply

either expressly or by implication to all persons who commit the proscribed act." Id. at 1247
(emphasis in original).
421. See supra PartV.
422. See supra PartV.
423. See Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1989) (describing how the victim was
clearly in the officer's presence and, thus, a special relationship could be easily found).
424. See supra Part V.

425. "The question is merely this, whether the defendants, having delegated the performance of
this work to agents of their own selection, are responsible for the manner in which the business of
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or a relationship between a car owner and someone whom the owner
allows to drive. This must also, naturally, be a relevant relationship,
which has already been defined as being concerned with the type of
interest that was ultimately harmed by the defendant's negligence. 4 2 6
This is why, for example, an employee must have been "acting in the
course of his employment" in order to fix the employer with liability. 4 2 7
Acting "on a frolic of his own" would mean going outside the scope of
that relationship and thus involving different interests. 428 It would then
make no sense to hold that the employer nevertheless owed a duty of
care to the victim in such circumstances.
But where, because of a relevant relationship, a potentially
vicarious tortfeasor had the opportunity by the time of the tort to identify
the victim (whether by name429 or through the victim's physical
presence), 43 0 then they too owe the victim a duty of care. As a
consequence, the victim may then seek recovery from both the direct
and the vicarious tortfeasor.4 31
2. Secondary Victims
The law's recognition of secondary (i.e., vicarious) defendants
surely made it only a matter of time before the law would also be forced
to face the possibility of secondary victims. Sometimes misleadingly
referred to as "bystanders," these are individuals who suffer emotional
distress because of physical injury sustained by the primary victim.43 2
But whereas the law has been prepared to embrace vicarious liability
quite readily, it has always been reluctant to treat secondary victims in
anything like the same manner.4 33 Green noted this reluctance nearly a
century ago:
It is clear that the courts in the denial of protection to the relational
interest were influenced by the fear of imposing a double recovery.

the agency was done. As to that the answer is not doubtful." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E.
441, 450 (N.Y. 1931).
426. Id. at 448.
427. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 486 (1853).
428. Joel v. Morrison, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834).
429. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922).
430. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1050-52 (N.Y. 1916).
431. Id. at 1052.
432. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989); Richard N. Pearson, Liability
to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm: A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary

Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982); John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a
Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J.
477 (1984).
433. Green, supra note 13, at 473.
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Also, the lack of adequate legal theory doubtless blurred the problems
presented for judgment. The courts erroneously placed emphasis upon
the wrongful conduct of defendant rather than upon the two interests
involved. 434

As all United States jurisdictions now more-or-less recognize,
however, there is no reason to perpetuate this error. It certainly cannot be
justified by identity-based relational theory which, as we have just seen
in the context of vicarious liability, has no trouble in principle with
recognizing the significance of parties at one remove. In practice-and
just as in every other instance-what the theory requires is that the
plaintiff can establish that they were indeed identifiable by the defendant
at the time of the tort, so that they were owed a duty of care. 35
Ochoa v. Superior Court436 provides the classic example, and also
highlights why the identity-based relational approach should be
adopted. 4 7 A teenager, Rudy Ochoa, was taken into juvenile custody,
where he developed bilateral pneumonia and a fever. 4 3 8 Despite repeated
requests and pleading from his mother, who was regularly at his bedside
to witness his pain and distress, Rudy was treated for nothing more than
a bad cold. 43 9 No X-rays were taken, and no blood or urine test
performed. After three days, he was dead." 0 Rudy's mother then brought
a negligence action against the County and four of its agents and
employees for compensation for the trauma she had suffered in
witnessing her son's plight."
Every judge on the Supreme Court of California held that she had
made out the requirements necessary to show that she had been owed a
duty of care.4 2 It might be thought that this means that the California
courts had found this case easy. But far from it; Mrs. Ochoa was
appealing to have her claim reinstated after a lower court had dismissed
it." 3 The problem was recognized by all the judges who wrote an
opinion: it revolved around trying to apply a set of guidelines laid down
in a previous case, known as Dillon v. Legg44 :

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054.
703 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1985).
See id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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In determining, in such a case, whether defendant should reasonably
foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether
defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into
account such factors as the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was
located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a
distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional
impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory
and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether
plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship." 5

Writing for the majority, Justice Broussard emphasized that these
were "merely guidelines."4"6 But, of course, that hardly clarified things.
Chief Justice Bird argued that: "What has followed in Dillon's wake is
confusion rather than clarity [which] has led to arbitrary, inconsistent
and inequitable results antithetical to principles enunciated in Dillon."" 7
While Justice Grodin hit the nail on the head, noting that the Dillon
guidelines had caused "[t]he principle of foreseeability, normally a
question for the jury, [to] bec[o]me fused . .. with the concept of
duty."448
Applying identity-based relational approach greatly simplifies and
rationalizes the judge's task. It simply asks (a) whether the secondary
victim had a relevant relationship with the primary victim; and (b)
whether the defendant could have identified the plaintiff at the time of
the tort. In the case of the five defendants sued by Mrs. Ochoa, the
answer to both questions was an unequivocal "yes." Not only was she
(a) Rudy's mother, but (b) she was known both by name and by her
physical presence at the scene. 9
The fact that Mrs. Ochoa was a secondary victim, rather than a
primary victim, is relevant only to the following extent. We know that a
relationship between the defendant and a third party is capable of
generating a duty of care to a primary victim. 4 0 In the case of a
secondary victim, however, the relevant third party is actually the
secondary victim themselves-the first and second parties are, of course,
the primary victim and the direct tortfeasor. 41 So what matters when a
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id. at 920.
Ochoa, 703 P.2d at 12.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 3.
See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
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duty to a potential secondary victim is being considered is whether there
was a relevant relationship between the primary victim and the third
party secondary victim.
Because this identity-based relational approach has yet to be
adopted, confusion has continued to reign in the courts over when a duty
may be owed to a secondary victim. In California, this confusion
45
famously manifested itself again in Thing v. La Chusa. 1 There Justice
Broussard once again emphasized that Dillon had merely laid down
guidelines,"' while Justice Kaufman played King Canute"' and argued
that the law should be turned back to a time when the law refused to
45 5
recognize the owing of any duty at all to secondary victims.
Identity-based relational theory rejects both positions. Broussard's is
unnecessarily complicated and unpredictable, while Kaufman's is simply
not relational at all.
The majority opinion, set out by Justice Eagleson, got much closer
to an identity-based relational approach, but it is unduly restrictive. It
decided that it was time to treat the Dillon guidelines as having ossified
into rules, which seems much more apt for a question of law for the
court to decide. These dictate that a secondary victim will be owed a
duty only when "closely related to the [primary] injury
victim . .. present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time
it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim."456
There can be no doubt that the requirement of a close relationship
with the primary victim is correct. Such a relationship fulfills the
relevancy requirement because it concerns, among other things, the
secondary victim's psychological interest in the well-being of the
primary victims. The problem is with the requirements quoted after the
ellipsis.
First, as we have seen, presence at the scene is one way of
457
establishing identity in order to be owed a duty of care. But it is not
the only way. In fact, it is more common for identity to be proved by
458
There
showing that the defendant was aware of the victim's name.
to
an
alternative
as
permitted
not
be
seems little reason why this should
the "presence at the scene" requirement.
Second, identity-based relational theory considers the Thing court's
requirement that the secondary victim be aware that the tort "is causing
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
Id. at 841.
Id. at 836.
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id.
See supra Part V.J.1.
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injury to the victim" to be entirely redundant. In fact, such a requirement
views the issue from entirely the wrong perspective. What the secondary
victim could perceive is irrelevant, because the plaintiff does not have
the information necessary to make decisions that take account of the
defendant's potential actions. It is the ability of the defendant to be
aware of the identity of the victim-whether primary or secondary-that
matters.45 9
Thirdly, such a redundant requirement has the potential to be highly
discriminatory. An unsighted secondary victim might not, for example,
be able to perceive what is happening to the primary victim only because
of a lack of visual faculties. The law should not be in the business of
adopting tests for duty that have the effect of establishing second-class
citizens who will rarely qualify as secondary victims.
In any event, it should be remembered that the purpose of duty is to
ensure that there is no prospect of liability to an indeterminate class. 4 60
Identity-based relational theory holds that the secondary victim needs to
prove (a) a duty owed by the defendant to the primary victim, and (b) a
relevant relationship between the primary and secondary victims. 4 61
Those who can establish both those requirements will inevitably be very
small in number. Adopting this approach will hardly cause the
floodgates of liability to an indeterminate class to be forced open, but it
will make the law both easier to apply and easier to predict. Much
confusion and litigation will thereby be avoided.
K.

Summary

A Cardozo-inspired, identity-based relational theory of duty of care
in negligence revolves around proof of a relevant relationship.4 62 In this
context, a relationship is relevant if it involves the type of interest that
was ultimately harmed.4 63
For primary victims-those who suffer injury not predicated on an
injury to someone else-such a relationship may be found between the
plaintiff and the defendant, or between the defendant and a third party,
or between the plaintiff and an organization that owes a duty to the

459. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (limiting those to whom
duty is owed to prevent defendant from owing a duty to unknown classes of potential plaintiffs);

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (finding that a manufacturer has
fair warning of owing a duty to all users of an automobile because of its inherently dangerous
nature).

460.
461.
462.
463.

See Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 444.
See id. at 444; Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989).
See UltramaresCorp., 174 N.E. at 444 (limiting duty to an established relationship).
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
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general public.'4 But establishing such a relevant relationship is still not
quite enough. In addition, the relationship must have been such as to
465
This may be
enable the defendant to know the victim's identity.
was in a
defendant
the
established in either of two ways. One is where
4
position to know the victim's name at the time of the tort. In cases of
physical harm, identity may alternatively be established if the victim had
467
been present at the scene at the time of the tort.
Where either the plaintiff or defendant is at one remove from the
immediate nexus between primary victim and direct tortfeasor,
additional relationships are required. 468 For vicarious liability, this
requires the addition of a relevant relationship between the direct
469
Secondary victims, on the other
tortfeasor and vicarious defendant.
hand, need to establish both a relevant relationship between the
defendant and primary victim and a relevant relationship between the
47 0
primary and secondary victims.
Identity-based relational theory does not need a long list of
471
It does not involve using a
"factors" to be "taken into account."
criterion of foreseeability, which is too unpredictable for questions of
law. It does not even require that judges factor in matters of policy, since
the policy of avoiding liability to an indeterminate class of potential
plaintiffs is already built-in. Instead, it provides a simple and predictable
method of answering the question of whether a plaintiff is owed a duty
of care in negligence. It is time for the courts to adopt it.
VI.

POSTSCRIPT: RESOLVING NEW CONTROVERSIES

It is one thing to show how identity-based relational theory can
explain the outcome of past cases. It is, admittedly, quite another to
show how it can be used to resolve emerging issues without fuss or
complexity. Yet, as will now be seen, it makes resolving the duty issue
in such cases far more straightforward than the current approaches with
which the courts have forced themselves to grapple.

464. See Ultramares Corp., 171 N.E. at 444; Thing, 771 P.2d at 829; Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.
2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989).
465.

See supra Part V.A-B.

466. See supra Part V.D, G, J.1.
467.
468.
469.
470.

See supra Part
See supraPart
See supra Part
See supra Part

V.D, J.1.
V.D.
V.J.1.
V.J.2.

471. See supra Part V.J.2.
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PrenatalInjuries and Wrongful Conceptions, Births, and Lives

Cases of prenatal injury, "wrongful conception," "wrongful birth,"
and "wrongful life" present classic examples. The meaning of prenatal
injury is self-evident: an injury caused to a fetus before birth. 472 The
other terms, however, might be less familiar.
Wrongful conception may be alleged when a vasectomy or female
sterilization procedure is carried out negligently, so that the patient
remains fertile and conception occurs against the wishes of the
parents.4 73 The harm alleged here is not suffered by the child, who is
born healthy, but to one or both parents. 474 Their harm is potentially one
or more of the following:
(a) the pain endured by the mother while pregnant;
(b) the medical costs of pregnancy;
(c) the cost to the parents of the upkeep and upbringing of a
child whom they had not planned to have;
(d) emotional distress to the parents at the fact of conception;
(e) emotional distress to the parents at the prospect of bringing
up a(nother) child (especially if they are already in dire financial
straights or are suffering from, or are prone to, some sort of
psychological disorder); and/or
(f) emotional distress to the parents at the prospect of having to
have a termination.
Similar costs are involved in a "wrongful birth" claim, which is an
action brought by parents claiming that medical negligence caused them
not to know that the fetus was damaged, so that the mother was
effectively denied the opportunity to have a termination.47 5 A "wrongful
life" claim, on the other hand, is one brought on behalf of a child in
similar circumstances on the grounds that their pain and suffering is so
excruciating that they should never have been born.476 In Procanik By
Procanik v. Cillo, for example, the mother's doctors had failed to
diagnose that she had contracted rubella (German measles) in the first
trimester of her pregnancy, so that her son was born with congenital
rubella syndrome.47 7

472.

See What Are PrenatalInjuries?, LAWS (Dec. 22, 2019), https://tort.laws.com/limited-

duty/prenatal-injuries.
473. Wrongful Conception, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
474. Id.
475. Wrongful Birth, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
476. Procanik By Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J. 1984).
477. Id. at 757.
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The law in this area is currently a mess. Although a duty to the
478
child has been recognized in cases of prenatal injury since the 1950s,
47 9
When
some states have refused to recognize claims for wrongful life.
of
Court
Supreme
the
adjudicating upon a wrongful birth claim,
Kentucky declared baldly: "The parents of a normal healthy child whom
they now love have not suffered any injury or damage. The benefits
conferred by the child's existence clearly outweigh any economic
burden involved."80
According to the identity-based relational approach, such a
sentiment is clearly misplaced. The types of harm listed above are
clearly real, and the law of torts does not normally allow defendants to
confer undesired benefits on plaintiffs so as to claim that the latter have
481
Gut reactions over whether the
not actually suffered any harm at all.
law should be prepared to award compensation for the birth of a human
being should not be allowed to distract attention away from the legal
issues at stake, which are really no different from those in any other case
of medical malpractice.
In fact, there should really be nothing problematic about a wrongful
birth claim at all. The defendant in such a case will clearly know the
identity of the mother and, almost certainly, the father (or other parent in
the case of same-sex couples). A duty of care will thus be established,
and the case should proceed like any other claim of medical malpractice.
Cases of wrongful conception should be treated in much the same way,
and for precisely the same reasons. Denying such claims would create
anomalies in the law and achieve nothing worthwhile, whereas applying
identity-based relational theory would ensure consistency and
predictability. From a legal standpoint, these should surely be easy
cases.
Cases of wrongful life should hardly be more problematic. As we
know, the identity-based relational approach requires that the defendant
4 82
can identify the plaintiff at the time of the tort. There can be no doubt
that a doctor can identify a fetus, and that a fetus is also, without doubt, a
separate entity:
478. See Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434, 439-40 (Miss. 1954); Tucker v. Howard L.
Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 912 (Ga. 1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550,
560-61 (Md. 1951); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. 1955); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291
P.2d 225, 228 (Or. 1955); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557, 557 (Del. 1956);
Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249, 251 (N.H. 1957).
479. See, e.g., Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 215 (Ga. 1999).
480. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983).
481. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960) (discussing a problem within
the law when both a mother and child are left without remedy after being subject to medical
negligence).

482. See supra Part III.F.
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If the law in cases of negligently inflicted prenatal injuries were
to ... consider an unborn child as part of its mother, then the mother
should be able to recover for the pain, suffering, and incapacity to this
part of her, just as to any other part. We know of no case allowing such
recovery. As early as 1908, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
specifically denied it, holding that "[s]uch damages pertain to the child
alone. The mother is no more entitled to them than the father is." 483

The only question left is whether the fetus is an entity with
independent legal personality sufficient to enable it to qualify as an
identifiable plaintiff. Yet this question has been answered consistently in
the positive for over half a century. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey
observed back in 1960: "If neither mother nor child can recover, then a
life impaired by another's fault must be endured without the recompense
which the law provides for other persons wrongfully injured. The law
should take care that, wherever possible, a wrong should not go
completely unrequited."4 84
The court, therefore, went on to hold that the fetus had been owed a
duty of care such that the child, after birth, could maintain an action
against those negligently responsible for his prenatal injuries. 4 85 There
seems no reason to treat cases of wrongful life any differently.
B.

Non-Delegable Duties

Non-delegable duties are duties originally taken on by one party
that, no matter the circumstance, cannot be passed off to a third party.4 86
Such duties arise when "the responsibility is so important to the
community that the [defendant] should not be permitted to transfer it to
another."4 87 Attorneys, for example, have a non-delegable duty towards
their clients. 88 They cannot contract this duty out to a third party. 489 For
so long as they are the client's attorney, they owe such a duty. 490
Duties owed (in respect of physical injury) by those who own or
manage premises to those coming onto those premises are another prime

483. Smith, 157 A.2d at 502-03 (quoting Prescott v. Robinson, 69 A. 522, 524 (N.H. 1908)).
484. Id. at 503.
485. Id. at 504.
486. See Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712, 715 (N.Y. 1993).
487. Id. at 716.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 714, 716.
490. Agency-The
Basic
Law,
STIMMEL
LAW,
https://www.stimmellaw.com/en/articles/agency-basic-law (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
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example, 4 91 and identity-based relational theory provides a simple
rationale for such cases. For it is self-evident that whoever comes onto a
person's premises is present on scene, and so the owner or manager is in
a position to know the visitor's identity. This does not, of course,
prevent others from also owing a duty to the visitor-as we have seen,
relational theory recognizes that there may be multiple relevant
relationships-but it does mean that the owner or manager cannot divest
themselves of such a duty by contracting it out to a third party. While the
visitor remains on the premises, the duty remains in existence.
There is, however, one apparent anomaly in American law's
application of this concept. It manifests itself when a patient receives
medical treatment in a hospital. If the patient slips on a greasy floor that
should have been cleaned, she will have a claim against the hospital on
the basis of either vicarious liability or non-delegable duty; and, if
injured by the negligence of a nurse, she will have a claim against the
hospital on the basis of vicarious liability. Yet, if injured by the
negligence of a doctor, she will typically be unsuccessful in bringing
either type of claim against the hospital and will have to sue the doctor
4 92
personally-and only the doctor.
For almost all common lawyers from outside the United States,
identity-based relational theory would clearly reach a different
conclusion. They would perceive a relevant relationship between patient
and hospital, from which the latter would be in a position to identify the
former (whether by name or by presence at the scene). From that it
follows that the hospital would owe a duty to the patient in respect of the
medical care as much as for the state of the premises. And, since such a
duty is "so important to the community," the duty would be
4 93

non-delegable.
Perhaps this is also the approach that should be adopted in
American jurisdictions. 49 4 But currently it seems that American tort law
is beguiled by the concept of the "attending physician," according to
which a patient has a relationship for medical care with that particular
495
doctor, but not with the hospital. Thus the requirement of relevance in
the relationship with the latter does not exist so far as the medical care is
concerned; the hospital's responsibility relates instead solely to
management of the premises.
491. Such a non-delegable duty may sometimes be extended to cover general contractors too,
although, as the New York case of Rizzuto v. Wenger Contracting Co. demonstrates, this is more

typically achieved via statute. 693 N.E.2d 1068, 1070 (N.Y. 1998).
492. See Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
493. Kleeman, 614 N.E.2d at 716.
494. As argued by Altenbernd, C.J., in Roessler, 858 So. 2d at 1163-64.
495. Id. at 1162.
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Relinquishinga Duty

Closely related to the issue of non-delegable duties is the question
of whether (and, if so, when) the law permits a person to relinquish a
duty. The Heitzman case, discussed above, implicitly raised this issue. 496
For the court did not make it clear whether Susan had never been in a
position to control the conduct of either of her brothers, or whether she
had previously been in such a position but had somehow relinquished
the duty to do so after she had moved out of the house that she had
formerly shared with them. 497
According to identity-based relational theory, a duty of care in
negligence is established through a relevant relationship. 498 It therefore
follows that there can be no duty where no such relationship exists. 499
This also means that, if someone wishes to relinquish a duty that they
currently owe, then they must take steps to end the relevant relationship.
The problem, of course, is working out how that should be done. This is
complicated by two factors: (a) the absence of a discrete formation phase
in the law of negligence; and (b) the need to ensure that the law does not
permit potential defendants to compromise the safety of the plaintiff
who, as we have already established, lacks the information necessary to
make decisions that take account of the defendant's potential actions.
In the case of what I have called public relationships, it is submitted
that the only way to relinquish a duty of care effectively is to ensure that
the duty is taken on by someone of at least equal expertise. 00 Someone
appointed as a legal guardian, for example, should be able to relinquish
such a duty only by having a court agree to pass it on to someone else.
Similarly, a receiver appointed to administer a bankruptcy should be
able to relinquish the relevant duties of care only by having a court
appoint a replacement receiver or by the termination of the
receivership.50 1
It would seem to be a similar story so far as duties arising out of a
relationship between plaintiff and defendant are concerned. A doctor, for
example, cannot relinquish a duty to a patient unless the duty has been
passed on to another doctor (although the patient can, of course,
unilaterally withdraw from the relationship and thus terminate the
496. See People v. Heitzman, 886 P.2d 1229, 1234, 1243, 1245 (Cal. 1994).
497. Id.
498. See supra Part V.
499. See supra Part v.

500. See supra Part v.I; infra Part VI.C.
501.

A guardianship or receivership may, of course, come to an end. But that would not

involve a relinquishing of a duty so much as the circumstances that give rise to such a duty being no
longer in existence.
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doctor's duty). A parent cannot give up a duty to a child unless it is
successfully passed to someone else acting in loco parentis, such as a
school. And a school that wishes to relinquish a duty to a child in its care
cannot merely abandon the child; it will ordinarily pass the child back
into the care of a parent, or else into the care of a public authority or
social services.
Where the relevant relationship is one involving a third party,
however, it is submitted that the position is very different. It was this
type of relationship that was at stake in Heitzman, for only if Susan had
previously been under a duty to control the behavior of her brothers
50 2
could she have at the same time owed a duty of care to her father. So
if she terminated the relationship with her brothers that gave her such
control, then it would seem to follow that she would also have
successfully relinquished the duty she had previously owed to her father.
That should not, as a matter of principle, have endangered her
father's safety because her brothers both still owed him a duty of care.
The fact that, in practice, they breached that duty should not change the
legal position; it is always possible for someone who owes a duty to
breach it. Indeed, without such breaches, there would be no need for the
law of negligence at all.
Similarly, if the therapist in Tarasoff had no longer been treating
Poddar, he would no longer have owed a duty to
murderous
the
50 3
Tatiana. And, in Mussivand, if the lover had stopped having an affair
with the plaintiff's wife, then he too would have successfully
relinquished the duty of care.504
D.

DataPrivacy and Security

Finally, we come to the issue of organizations that obtain and store
personal information about clients, customers, and sales prospects.
Professor Jack Balkin has termed such organizations "information
fiduciaries," but coining new terms is less important than understanding
what they represent.50 5 As Balkin himself recognizes, that concept "does
not solve all of the problems," and it seems at least arguable that such a
label only adds to the confusion.5 06 A "fiduciary" is someone with
507
obligations that are regulated in equity by the law of trusts, but it is
502.
503.
504.

Heitzman, 886 P.2d at 1234, 1243, 1245.
See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 339-41 (Cal. 1976).
See Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 269-70, 272-73 (Ohio 1989).

505.

Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV

1183, 1194, 1207-08 (2016).
506. Id. at 1187.
507. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 363, 370 (Del. 2006).
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unclear if Balkin intends to invoke such law, or whether he really means
to talk of special relationships for the purposes of the law of torts.508
Unless and until he attempts to address the question of remedies for
breaches of the relationship, this will remain unclear.
The truth is that, at least so far as the law of torts is concerned, such
levels of complexity are unnecessary. It is already clear that
identity-based relational theory means the law of negligence should
recognize that a duty of care is owed to any data subject whose personal
information is held by another, if the latter can thereby identify the data
subject.509 This will always be the case where the person using or storing
the information has the ability to retrieve the data subject's name in plain
text. This means that, only if the information is anonymized, or if the
data subject's name is encrypted, will such a duty not apply. Otherwise,
whether the information was obtained from the data subject
themselves-here is a relationship between the plaintiff and defendantor as the result of a relationship with a third party, the data subject will
be owed a duty by those in a position to manage the data concerned.
E.

Conclusion

As the issues discussed in this postscript make clear, identity-based
relational theory is not just effective at explaining past case law on duty
of care in negligence. It also provides a straightforward and easily
applicable method of approaching duty in cases that either involve novel
fact-patterns or apparently intractable issues of principle. Instead of
confusing the issue with discussion of foreseeability, or requiring that a
set of "factors" or "guidelines" be "taken into account,"" 0 it simply asks
the following questions in sequence:
1. Was there a relevant relationship (i.e., a relationship about the
type of interest that was ultimately harmed) between the plaintiff
and the defendant, or between the defendant and a third party, or
between the plaintiff and an organization that owes a duty to the
general public?
If not, no duty was owed. But if so:

508.

See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 505, at 1207 ("The answer is that doctors, lawyers, and

accountants have special relationships of trust and confidence with their clients. These are fiduciary
relationships.").
509. See id. at 1222.
510. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
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2. Was that a relationship that was qualitatively different from any
relationship that the defendant might have had with the public at
large?
If not, no duty was owed. But if so:
3. In a case of physical harm, was the victim (or the victim's
property) present at the scene at the time of the tort?
If so, the plaintiff was owed a duty of care. But if not, or if the
case does not involve physical harm:
4. Was the defendant in a position to know the victim's name at the
time of the tort?
If so, the plaintiff was owed a duty of care. If not, the plaintiff
was not owed a duty of care.
If the answers to questions (3) and (4) establish that the plaintiff
was owed a duty of care, then the following questions also need
to be asked:
5. Was there a relevant relationship between the direct tortfeasor
and any potentially vicarious defendant?
If so, then the latter also owed the plaintiff a duty of care.
6. Was there a relevant relationship between the primary victim and
any secondary victim (i.e., a person whose emotional distress
occurred because of physical injury to the primary victim)?
If so, then the defendant(s) also owed a duty of care to the
secondary victim(s).
If adopted, this approach would save countless hours of litigation
and confusion (not to mention simplify the job of every torts professor)
and make the law vastly more predictable.
None of this Article means, of course, that identity-based relational
theory leads to the "best" or most morally appropriate outcomes. The
theory simply makes explicit the approach that the law appears hitherto
to have taken implicitly. But, even in situations where someone wishes
to argue that the law should behave differently, it should at least have the
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useful effect of meaning that both those advocating for change and those
resisting it should be starting from the same page.
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